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The Constitutionality
of an Executive Spending Plan
,BY PAUL E. SALAMANCA*
INTRODUCTION
peration of government in the absence of appropriations has
become relatively common in the United States, particularly when
projected expenses exceed projected revenue, making adoption of a budget
a difficult task for the legislature.' As of July 1, 2003, at least three states
were operating largely without legislative appropriations, and in one of
"James & Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law. I am indebted to several individuals who helped me put this
Article together, including Richard Ausness, Michael Cox, Dan Kelly, Harland
Hatter, Chris Lilly, Craig Maffet, and Douglas L. McSwain. In August 2002, 1 was
admitted pro hac vice to represent David L. Williams, President of the Senate, in
litigation over the constitutionality of the Governor's spending plan, and I remain
on staff as a consultant to Senator Williams. The views expressed herein are my
own, however, and not necessarily those of Senator Williams.
The constitutions of most states require the legislature to enact a balanced
budget. For this reason, and because of the dependence of most states' revenue
upon the condition of the economy, states have particular difficulty enacting
budgets in periods of economic distress. See generally Henry S. Wulf, Trends in
State Government Finances, in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 34 THE BOOK
OF THE STATES 273 (2002) ("When the economy sneezes, the states catch cold.").
Although the federal government can operate at a deficit without violating any
constitutional proscription, other difficulties can prevent the timely enactment of
appropriations at the federal level. See Alan L. Feld, Shutting Down the Govern-
ment, 69 B.U. L. REV. 971,976 (1989) (noting that legislation designed to enhance
fiscal planning at the federal level inadvertently impeded the appropriations
process); Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the
Party in Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 727 (2000) ("[T]he structure of
congressional budgeting leads almost inevitably to stalemate. Stalemate is not an
acceptable long-term outcome because appropriations bills must be passed to keep
the government running.. ").
2 See Laura Mansnerus, Trenton Reaches a Tentative Deal on State Budget,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al (indicating that California, Connecticut, and
Nevada had failed to adopt budgets for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2003).
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these states, California, the prospect of quick adoption of a budget seemed
exceedingly small.3 The high stakes of these situations justify careful
attention to the issues involved. Politicians do not want to ignore the needs
of people who depend on government, nor do they want to appear callous.4
On the other hand, they want to defend the prerogatives of office and
pursue their conceptions of good public policy in the critical context of
'See Jeffrey L. Rabin & Evan Halper, Amid Dire Warnings, State Again Misses
Budget Deadline, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at 1. California was experiencing a
severe shortfall in revenue that required either an increase in taxes or other sources
ofrevenue, significant cuts in spending, or a combination of both. See id. Governor
Gray Davis eventually signed a budget for the state on August 2, 2003, that
involved a combination of borrowing, cuts, and increases in fees. See Pui-Wing
Tam & Aaron Lucchetti, California Gets $99.1 Billion Budget, WALL ST. J., Aug.
4, 2003, at A6.
In Nevada, another extraordinary situation was developing as that state entered
the new fiscal year without comprehensive appropriations. On July 10, 2003, the
Supreme Court of Nevada granted a writ of mandamus against the state's
legislature, obligating that body to enact a balanced budget, to appropriate certain
funds for the state's educational system, and to disregard the state's constitutional
requirement of a two-thirds vote for an increase in taxes. See Guinn v. Legislature
ofNev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003). On July 21, the state adopted a comprehensive
budget, and on July 22 its Governor signed into law a bill that increased various
taxes. See Rochelle Williams, News In Brief: Nevada Governor Signs Tax
Increase, BOND BUYER, July 23, 2003, at 2. Interestingly, the vote to raise various
taxes passed by a margin of more than two-to-one in the legislature. See Ed Vogel,
Divisive tax ruling argued, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July 26, 2003, at lB.
Assembly Minority Leader Lynn Hettrick said Friday he would not be
surprised if the state Supreme Court reversed its controversial decision to
allow the state tax bill to pass by a simple majority. He made the statement
on the same day that Attorney General Brian Sandoval filed a brief in the
case, saying a high court rehearing sought by Republican lawmakers is
unnecessary because the Legislature successfully passed its tax and
spending bill by the constitutionally required two-thirds vote.
Id.
' Indeed, the political stakes in a budgetary standoff can be prodigious. See
generally Garrett, supra note 1, at 707 (discussing the consequences of impasse at
the federal level) ("Unresolved budgetary train wrecks are intolerable; indeed, the
budget is the only legislative matter that must be completed each fiscal year.");
GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, ALL Too HUMAN 403-04 (1999) (discussing the
impasse reached by Congress and President Clinton in late 1995); DICK MORRIS,
BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE: GETING REELECTED AGAINST ALL ODDS 183-89
(1990) (same); id. at 183 (quoting a note from Morris to the President) ("Our
commitment to a balanced budget is getting lost in the partisan confrontation over
who is to blame for the shutdown.").
[VOL. 92
EXECUTIVE SPENDING PLAN
appropriations. Finally, the polity as a whole has a strong interest in
preserving lines of authority and separation of power.5
From July 1, 2002, until March 26, 2003, a period of almost nine
months, Kentucky's executive branch went about its business largely
without appropriations by the General Assembly. Instead, money was
disbursed from the treasury according to an executive spending plan
authorized by Governor Paul E. Patton in late June 2002.6 Litigation ensued
as to the constitutionality of these disbursements, particularly in light of
Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that "[n]o money
shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropria-
tions made by law,"7 as well as Kentucky Revised Statutes ("K.R.S.")
section 41.110, which implements Section 230.8 In the end, the question of
the spending plan's constitutionality was not resolved by the courts because
the legislature's enactment of a budget for the executive branch in March
2003 led to the dismissal of the action as moot.
The issues presented by the Governor's spending plan go to the heart
of constitutional theory and practical politics. If the chief executive enjoys
a general power to disburse money from the treasury without legislative
authority, one of the central tenets of separation of powers is undermined.
Careful attention to the events surrounding the Governor's plan and its
legal ramifications is therefore justified.
This Article proceeds in seven parts. In Part I, this Article recapitulates
the history of the spending plan, including the action filed in Franklin
' See generally Feld, supra note 1, at 971-72 (discussing the tensions inherent
in resolving gaps in appropriations).
6 The judiciary, known in Kentucky as the "Court of Justice," also operated
during this approximate period under a "judicial spending plan" adopted pursuant
to an executive order of the ChiefJustice, Joseph E. Lambert. See infra note 27 and
accompanying text. In the abstract, the issues presented by a judicial spending plan
are the same as those presented by an executive spending plan.
7 Ky. CONST. § 230. As it turns out, the litigation was not initiated by parties
opposing the plan, but instead by the Commonwealth's Treasurer, who was anxious
about releasing money from the treasury without appropriations. See infra note 28
and accompanying text.
8 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 41.110 (Michie 1997). This
statute provides as follows:
No public money shall be withdrawn from the Treasury for any purpose
other than that for which its withdrawal is proposed, nor unless it has been
appropriated by the General Assembly or is a part of a revolving fund, and
has been allotted as provided in KRS 48.010 to 48.800 [portions of the
chapter on the budget], and then only on the warrant of the Finance and
Administration Cabinet.
2003-2004]
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Circuit Court to affirm its constitutionality. 9 In Part II, this Article discusses
certain theoretical, historical, and legal principles that inform analysis of
the plan." In Part III, it considers certain deviations and possible deviations
from the general rule that the legislature controls disbursements of public
funds.1 In Part IV, this Article discusses certain learned opinion from
jurisdictions outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky that bears on the
expenditure of public funds without appropriations. 2 In Part V, it considers
the issue of standing, which could inhibit judicial review of an executive
spending plan.'3 In Part VI, it discusses the issue of justiciability, which
could likewise inhibit judicial review of such a plan. 14 Finally, in Part VII,
this Article evaluates some options and identifies two that the public
officials of Kentucky should consider. 5 Under the first option, the General
Assembly would enact legislation authorizing disbursements from the
treasury in the event of a budgetary impasse solely for essential public
services, which the legislature would define with some specificity. Under
the second option, the Attorney General of Kentucky would issue a formal
opinion confirming that the power of the purse lies in the legislature and
describing the limited exceptions to this rule that have been recognized by
the courts and by officials considering analogous issues in other jurisdic-
tions. Only by pursuing one of these two options, or an option of a similar
nature, can separation of powers be adequately respected.
I. BACKGROUND
Gaps in appropriations, such as the one experienced by Kentucky's
executive and judicial branches in 2002-2003, arise at the intersection of
law and politics, and attract significant attention from both the public and
political leaders. As a consequence, courts called upon to intervene in such
matters may prefer to exercise whatever discretion is available to them to
avoid making a decision that would preclude political resolution of the
situation. This will tend to obscure fine distinctions between legal and
political matters, justifying a wider focus in the review of facts.
On Tuesday, April 15, 2002, the General Assembly adjourned from its
regular session without having adopted a budget for the executive or
9 See infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 42-71 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 72-143 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 144-200 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 201-62 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 263-85 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 286-96 and accompanying text.
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judicial branches of government for the fiscal biennium commencing July
1 of that year.16 In particular, the two chambers of the legislature, the House
of Representatives and the Senate, were not able to agree on whether to
fund so-called "partial public financing" ("PPF") of gubernatorial elections
in the state. 7 The House insisted on providing this funding, but the Senate
refused to concur. Few, if any, other issues seriously divided the two
chambers.18
Two days later, the Governor called the legislature back into extraordi-
nary session to adopt comprehensive budgets for the executive and judicial
branches. 9 Although some hope for a compromise over PPF emerged during
the extraordinary session,2" disagreement over fundamental issues persisted.2
16 See Tom Loftus, 2002 Kentucky General Assembly; Special Session to Start
Monday; Patton Calls on Lawmakers to Deal with Budget, Tax Issues, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 18, 2002, at B 1. The General Assembly had previously
enacted a budget for the legislative branch for this period. See 2002 Ky. Acts ch.
172 (signed by the Governor on April 2, 2002).
'" For a description of "PPF," see Jennifer Moore, Note, Campaign Finance
Reform in Kentucky, 85 KY. L.J. 723 (1997). After the publication of Ms. Moore's
article, the Sixth Circuit upheld the most salient features of PPF against constitu-
tional challenge. See Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1177 (1999). The merits of PPF are not pertinent to this Article.
8 See Al Cross, 2002 Kentucky GeneralAssembly; Future ofPublic Financing
of Governor's Race Hinges on Special Session, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr.
21, 2002, at A l (describing the future of PPF as "the key dispute as lawmakers
reconvene tomorrow for a special session to resolve the impasse over a state
budget"); Tom Loftus, 2002 Kentucky GeneralAssembly; THEBUDGET; Campaign
Financing Aside, House and Senate Aren't Far Apart, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.), Apr. 21, 2002, at A8.
19 See Paul E. Patton, Proclamation (issued Apr. 17, 2002). The Governor's
power to call the legislature into extraordinary session is conferred in Section 80
of the constitution.
20 See Joseph Gerth, Deadlock on Budget Might Be Easing, House Speaker
Signals Willingness to Talk on Campaign Finance, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
Apr. 24, 2002, at Al ("House Speaker Jody Richards yesterday signaled a
willingness by Democrats to talk with Senate Republicans about how much public
financing should go into next year's gubernatorial campaigns.").
21 See Joseph Gerth, Kentucky House OKs Budget; Democrats 'Motion Blocks,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 26, 2002, at Al.
House Democrats slammed the door yesterday on budget amendments
as the House voted to pass the same $35 billion budget bill proposed by
Gov. Paul Patton on Monday ....
2003-2004]
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On May 1, 2002, the General Assembly adjourned from this session, again
without having adopted the remaining budgets.22
Meanwhile, on April 25, the Attorney General delivered a letter to the
Governor's Counsel indicating that the Governor had both the power and
the duty under the Constitution to "take whatever action he deems neces-
sary" to carry out his constitutional duties, including ordering funds to be
drawn from the treasury in the absence of appropriations.23
In accordance with this letter, the Governor issued an executive order
on June 26, 2002, in which he asserted a power to promulgate a comprehen-
sive executive spending plan in the absence of appropriations by the
legislature.24 In paragraph six thereof, the Governor declared:
[T]he Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet is hereby
authorized to issue warrants for the payment of all claims as may be made
by the Executive Branch of government in accordance with the Executive
Spending Plan outlined in the order of the [Secretary] issued concurrently
herewith, and to assist the Court of Justice as may be necessary to
implement lawful expenditures for its operation.25
On the same day, the Secretary issued an order implementing the Gover-
nor's spending plan.26 The next day, June 27, the Chief Justice promulgated
The move enraged Republicans, who charged that Democrats were
making a mockery of the budget process to avoid voting on important and
sensitive amendments-particularly some that would have diverted $9
million in public financing of the 2003 campaigns for governor to other
state programs.
Id.
22 Al Cross et al., 2002 Kentucky General Assembly; Lawmakers Fail to Pass
State Budget; Special Session Adjourns Without Resolving Campaign Finance
Dispute, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), May 2,2002, at A l ("The special legislative
session to pass a $35 billion state budget adjourned last night after failing to reach
agreement on spending limits and partial public financing of campaigns for
governor.").
23 See Letter from Albert B. Chandler III & Ryan M. Halloran, to Denis
Fleming (Apr. 25, 2002) (on file with author) ("The rule that no money may be
drawn from the state treasury without an appropriation does not hold in the face of
other legal mandates which provide for the needs of the public.").
24 See Exec. Order No. 2002-727 para. 6, at 4.
25 id.
26 See Commonwealth of Kentucky, Finance and Administration Cabinet,
Office of the Secretary, An Order Directing the Implementation of the Executive
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an executive order implementing a spending plan to cover the expenses of
the judiciary from July 1 forward.27
June 26 also saw the beginning of litigation over the issues presented
by the plan. On that day the Treasurer brought suit against the Secretary in
Franklin Circuit Court, seeking an order declaring that the plan comported
in all respects with the Kentucky Constitution, and permitting the Treasurer
to draw funds from the treasury pursuant to the plan without liability.
28
Within a short period of time, several parties successfully moved to
intervene in this matter, including David L. Williams, President of the
Senate, the Kentucky Retirement Systems Board of Trustees ("Kentucky
Retirement"), and Cicely Jaracz Lambert, Executive Director of the
Administrative Office of the Courts ("AOC").
The Treasurer moved for summary judgment on August 22. Although
the scheduling order pursuant to which the Treasurer filed this motion
called for a relatively quick response from certain of the intervening parties
(Senator Williams and Kentucky Retirement), this aspect of the order was
suspended in late August after Senator Williams brought a motion for
temporary injunctive relief.29 This motion was taken under advisement and
discovery ensued. In accordance with a new scheduling order, Kentucky
Retirement and Senator Williams responded to the Treasurer's motion for
summary judgment and filed their own motions on February 6 and 7,2003,
respectively; the Secretary filed his own dispositive and responsive papers
Spending Plan Authorized and Approved by Executive Order 2002-727 para. 2
(2002).
27 Cf Tom Loftus, Judicial Spending Questioned; ChiefJustice to Use Budget
That Didn't Pass, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 23, 2002, at B 1 ("In a budget
decision mirroring Gov. Paul Patton's spending plan, ChiefJustice Joseph Lambert
says he will run the state court system beginning July 1 based on a budget that the
General Assembly never passed.").
28 See Complaint for Declaratory Relief para. 3, at 8, Ky. Dep't of the Treasury
ex rel. Miller v. Ky. Fin. and Admin. Cabinet (Franklin Cir. Ct., filed June 26,
2003) (Civil No. 02-CI-00855) [hereinafter "Spending Plan Litigation"].
29 Senator Williams sought to prevent the expenditure of proceeds from the coal
severance tax in contravention of statute. See Notice-Motion to Amend Answer
paras. 7-14, at 6-7, Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28. Under the executive
spending plan, certain funds from this source were expended in a manner not
consistent with statute. Senator Williams based his argument upon Section 15 of
the constitution, which vests exclusive power to suspend statutes in the legislature.
See KY. CONST. § 15 ("No power to suspend laws shall be exercised unless by the
General Assembly or by its authority.").
2003-2004]
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on February 24; and Senator Williams and Kentucky Retirement filed final
papers on March 10.30
Meanwhile, progress had taken place, and was continuing to take place,
in the political arena. Shortly after the general election in November 2002,
Lieutenant Governor Steve Henry, at that time a possible candidate for
governor in 2003, announced that because of the Commonwealth' s pending
fiscal difficulties he would not participate in PPF even if the program were
funded.3 Other political leaders were reaching the same conclusion, and
31 Senator Williams argued that comprehensive disbursements from the treasury
without legislative approval violated separation of powers. See Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff Department of the Treasury's Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of Defendant David L. William's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 31-32, Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28. Senator Williams
asked the court either to require the Treasurer and Secretary to adhere to the
constitution or to pursue the appointment of a commissioner to supervise the
disbursement of funds until the legislature acted. See id. at 32.
Kentucky Retirement argued that the Governor lacked authority under the
constitution to suspend K.R.S. § 61.565, which requires the Commonwealth to
contribute to the state's retirement plan at a rate identified as actuarially sound by
Kentucky Retirement. See Memorandum of Kentucky Retirement Systems Board
of Trustees in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment on its Cross-Claim
at 1-2, Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28.
The Secretary defended the spending plan as a "reasonable and constitutional
basis for avoiding a government shutdown" before the General Assembly enacted
a budget. Response of the Finance and Administration Cabinet to the Motions for
Summary Judgment on Behalf of David L. Williams and Kentucky Retirement
Systems and Memorandum in Support of the Cabinet's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28. Specifically, the Secretary
argued that Sections 69 and 81 of the constitution empower the Governor to adopt
a comprehensive spending plan absent a budget enacted by the legislature. See id.
at 31. See infra notes 131-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope
of executive power under these sections of the constitution. The Secretary asked
the court to validate the spending plan in its entirety, subject only to the require-
ment that it not be arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 30-31. See infra note 285 for
a discussion of the applicability of this standard to the spending plan.
On February 24, 2003, Cicely Jaracz Lambert, Executive Director of the AOC,
filed a Response to the Treasurer's Motion for Summary Judgment, Spending Plan
Litigation, supra note 28. In a Judgment tendered with this response, the AOC
asked the court to grant the Treasurer's motion for summary judgment and to
uphold the judicial spending plan adopted by Chief Justice Lambert. See id at 1-2.
31 See Mark B. Chellgren, Death Knell is Sounded on Public Financing,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 11, 2002, at B8.
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the issue that had vexed the legislature to the point of impasse evaporated
without fanfare.32
On January 7, 2003, the General Assembly went back into regular
session in its first meeting since the Constitution had been amended to
permit short odd-year sessions.33 Legislators recognized the importance of
enacting a budget and dedicated most of their attention to that subject.34
Although PPF was no longer a divisive issue, the Commonwealth was
expecting a shortfall in revenue, 3 and disagreement over the raising of
taxes or the cutting of spending seemed likely.36 In the end, however,
legislators were able to resolve fundamental issues regarding taxing and
32 See id.
33 See KY. CONST. § 36(1). The amendment was proposed by 2000 Ky. Acts ch.
407 and ratified by the voters in the regular election of November 2000. Odd-year
sessions last only thirty days. See KY. CONST. § 36(1).
3'A1 Cross, GOP Scores Political Points in Lengthy Budget Process, COURIER-
J. (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 9, 2003, at A12.
During a break in budget talks, House Speaker Jody Richards was asked
what major legislation-other than the budget-would pass the soon-to-end
2003 General Assembly.
He couldn't think of any, illustrating how intent lawmakers were on
avoiding another political deadlock like the one that prevented passage of
a budget last year.
Id.
35 OnNovember 20,2002, the Consensus Forecasting Group ("CFG") predicted
a total diminution in revenues for the General Fund of $199.8 million for the fiscal
year beginning July 1, 2002 (FY '03), and of $203.1 million for the fiscal year
beginning July 1, 2003 (FY '04). See Letter from T. Kevin Flanery, Secretary of
the Finance and Administration Cabinet, to Crit Luallen, Secretary of the
Governor's Executive Cabinet, et al. 1 (Nov. 20, 2002). On January 29, 2003, the
CFG revised its estimate somewhat, reducing the expected diminution by $94.3
million for FY '03, and by $4.9 million for FY '04; see Letter from Gordon C.
Duke, Secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, to Mary E. Lassiter,
State Budget Director, et al. 1 (Jan. 29, 2003); see also Tom Loftus, State Trims
Estimate of Budget Shortfall; Severe Problems Still Expected in Next Fiscal Year,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Jan. 22, 2003, at Al.
36 See Tom Loftus, 2003 Kentucky General Assembly; The Budget Shortfall:
Patton, Lawmakers at Odds on Remedy; Governor Wants Tax Increases;
Legislature Favors Spending Cuts, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 2, 2003, at
X3 ("Interviews with [Senate President David] Williams and other key lawmakers
show the Democratic governor, the Democrat-controlled House and Republi-
can-controlled Senate remain far apart in reaching a consensus on the crisis. And
some fear there may be no agreement before this year's short session ends March
25.").
2003-2004]
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spending.37 On March 7, 2003, the judicial branch's budget for the fiscal
biennium commencing July 1,2002, became law,38 and on March 26,2003,
the executive branch's budget for the same period became law.39 In
addition, on March 31, the Governor signed Senate Bill 48, which
appropriated funds to cover any spending under the executive and judicial
spending plans that was not incorporated into the enacted budgets for the
executive and judicial branches.4" These three items arguably eliminated
any outstanding legal issues in the Treasurer's suit against the Secretary.
On April 28, 2003, Judge Graham dismissed the case as moot.4
With the adoption of budgets for the executive and judicial branches
of government, and the dismissal of the Treasurer's lawsuit as moot, a
serious constitutional and political dispute simply came to an end. But
comprehensive disbursements from the treasury without legislative
authorization constitute extraordinary and dubious exercises of executive
power. As I hope to demonstrate in the following part, had the Treasurer's
suit against the Secretary been resolved on the merits, judgment ideally
would have entailed a substantial limitation on the power of the executive
to expend money from the treasury without legislative approval.
II. SEPARATION OF POWER AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE
A. Theory and History
Separation of power is so familiar to us that it is easy to overlook its
theoretical basis. First and foremost, we separate power so that no one
branch of government can become too powerful and too much at liberty to
act in its own self-interest. Second, we separate power to enhance the
performance of elected officials, believing that deliberation and consider-
ation of competing points of view will, on the whole, produce more
pleasing results than centralized decision-making. Indeed, separation of
power is arguably the average citizen's best protection against poorly
37 See Tom Loftus, State Budget Passes; Leaders Hail Spending Plan Without
Tax Increase, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 11, 2003, at B 1.
38 See 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 14 (signed by the Governor on March 7, 2003).
'9 See id. ch. 156 (delivered to the Secretary of State on March 26, 2003, after
override of certain line-item vetoes).
40 See 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 182.
" See Order of Dismissal, Ky. Dep't of the Treasury ex rel. Miller v. Ky. Fin.
and Admin. Cabinet (Franklin Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 2003) (Civil No. 02-CI-00855).
Gordon Duke succeeded T. Kevin Flanery as Secretary of the Finance and
Administration Cabinet.
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conceived or self-serving policy. After keeping track ofjob and family, the
average citizen has relatively little time to investigate how government
conducts its business, and often may not get to the bottom of what the
government is doing anyway, even with a fair amount of attention.42
Arguably, such a person's best security against arbitrary government lies
in pitting the various branches of the government against each other and
letting each branch act as a check on every other. As James Madison wrote
in support of the federal Constitution over two hundred years ago:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must frst enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.
43
The "auxiliary precautions" to which Madison was referring are the
structural devices in a constitution that divide areas of authority. Thus, the
branch of the federal government that provides for an army and navy is not
the branch that commands it in the field." Similarly, the branch that defines
crimes is not the branch that prosecutes them.45 As the old saw tells us, if
two people are to split a pie, the simplest way to ensure a fair division is to
have one person cut the pie and the other choose which half to eat.
42 See generally Thomas G. West, The Constitutionalism ofthe Founders versus
Modern Liberalism, 6 NEXUS 75, 94 (2001) ("I have hardly ever met an ordinary
citizen who understands how federal policies are made today."); Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfunded Mandate, 23 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
741,751 (1997) ("The writings of cognitive psychologists reenforce the theoretical
underpinnings of the conclusion that the average voter often poorly comprehends
the public policies affecting him.").
43 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
"Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 ("The Congress shall have Power...
To raise and support Armies."), and id. cl. 13 ("The Congress shall have Power...
To provide and maintain a Navy."), with id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.").
45 Compare id. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 ("The Congress shall have Power. . .To provide
for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
States."), and id. cl. 10 ("The Congress shall have Power... To define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations."), with id. art. II, § 3 (The President "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.").
2003-20041
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In the scheme of separated power, the legislature sets basic policy,
46
and the executive carries it into effect. The legislature decides what the
government's priorities will be; it determines how much money is to be
raised from the private sector for public purposes; and it sets the general
duties, rights, privileges, and immunities of the population that do not arise
directly from a constitution.
As an allocation of power, the foregoing makes sense. Unlike the
judiciary, the legislature is not constrained to adhere to precedent or text
(other than constitutional limitations on its authority); it may take into
account public sentiment and ideological principles that a court may
consider ephemeral, or in any case a matter of subjective choice. And,
unlike the executive branch, the legislature is uniquely suited for the
mooting of important public issues. More than any other branch of
government, the legislature is deemed to reconstitute and speak for the
polity.47 In Kentucky, for example, the General Assembly has 138
members, from 138 distinct geographic districts, sitting in two distinct
chambers.4" No member reports to any other, and each member has a direct,
inalienable role in the process of deliberation and voting. In effect, the
legislature replicates the separation of powers within its ranks.
Perhaps the most significant exclusive power that lies in the legislature
is the so-called "power of the purse"--the exclusive power to levy taxes
against the populace and to order disbursement of funds from the treasury.
This power has a long historical pedigree. Indeed, one of the rallying cries
behind the American Revolution was "no taxation without representation,"
articulating the colonists' opposition to being taxed by Great Britain with-
' See generally Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610,
614 (Ky. 1992).
The establishment of public policy is granted to the legislature alone. It is
beyond the power of a court to vitiate an act of the legislature on the
grounds that public policy promulgated therein is contrary to what the court
considers to be in the public interest. It is the prerogative of the legislature
to declare that acts constitute a violation of public policy.
Id.
41 See generally Taylor v. Beckham, 56 S.W. 177, 179 (Ky. 1900).
The legislative branch of the government more nearly represents the people
than any other branch, and it is charged by the constitution and laws of this
state with many important interests directly affecting the people, to secure
which their independence of the executive is absolutely necessary.
Id. In this case, the Governor attempted to adjourn the General Assembly without
constitutional authority. The Court held this attempt invalid. See id.
48 See Ky. CONST. §§ 29, 33, 35.
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out having an effective voice in Parliament.4 9 But the precedent that the
government needs the consent of the legislature to exact money from the
population," or to spend it in any particular way,51 is much older than the
American Revolution, and in fact represents the culmination of centuries
of struggle between the Crown and Parliament. As one commentator has
summarized the matter:
The evolution of British representative democracy and the power of the
purse are inextricably intertwined. English monarchs traditionally used
Parliament as a means of raising revenues, usually to finance their military
adventures. Over the centuries, British Parliaments began to use this
revenue-raising authority to exact legislative concessions fromthe Crown,
threatening to withhold funds if their demands were not met. Parliamen-
tary insistence on a voice in governing the nation inevitably lead to
struggle with the monarchy, which was not eager to surrender its royal
prerogatives. The struggle came to a head during the reign of the Stuart
kings in the 17th century. By the end of the century, the nation had
suffered a protracted civil war, one king had lost his head, another had
been deposed in a bloodless coup, and the supremacy of Parliament had
been established. By the time of the American Revolution, Parliament's
dominance over the British public fisc was complete.
52
'9 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 177 (1969) ("The Americans' objection to parliamentary taxation was 'not
because we have no vote in electing members of Parliament, but because we are
not, and from our local situation never can be, represented there.' " (quoting a tract
from the eighteenth century)).
50 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 239-40 (1988) (describing the theory
according to which the Crown would request funds from Parliament, and
Parliament was empowered to levy taxes against the populace); Richard D. Rosen,
Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a
Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 28-44 (1998) (summarizing
the development of Parliament's power of the purse).
"1 See Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343, 1353 n.48
(1988) ("That appropriations may be spent only on the objects for which they are
appropriated is a fundamental underpinning of our democratic order. There were
early impeachments of officials in England for misapplication of appropriated
funds.").
52 Rosen, supra note 50, at 28-29. Legislative control over taxation also played
a crucial role in the French Revolution. A fiscal crisis compelled Louis XVI of
France to convene the Estates-General to approve new taxes, and disputes about
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In addition to having a long historical pedigree, the principle of
exclusive legislative control over taxation and appropriations occupies a
central position in the scheme of separated powers." Very little that
government does can be effected without cost, vesting substantial authority
in the branch of government that ultimately controls spending. Although the
increasing complexity of the modem world has tended to enhance the
authority of the executive, the legislature's retained power to control the
purse strings leaves it with a certain irreducible ability to make public
policy. 4 Without this retained power, firmly established in both text and
precedent, the role of the legislature would be seriously compromised."
the role of the bourgeoisie in that body set in motion a series of events that
indirectly culminated in the storming of the Bastille. See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS:
A CHRONICLE OFTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION 289 (1989) ("[A] government instituted
by the Estates-General would be a more dependable debtor. Broader consensus
would remove the obstacles to new sources of revenue, and those in turn would be
a firmer security for more loans."); id. at 290 ("This, then, was the vision of a
constitutional reformation in which the grandees of France would have the senior
role .... What they got instead was a revolution.").
13 See 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 16, 19-20 (1980) (describing the goal that "Con-
gress will determine for what purposes the government's money is to be spent and
how much for each purpose" as "elementary to a proper distribution of governmental
powers").
" The prerogative of the legislature to formulate policy is no less true in the
context of appropriations than in other contexts. As the court noted in Kuprion v.
Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Ky. 1994):
The cases which have considered the relationship between budget questions
and statutes reflect the fact that budgeting can be in many ways the most
dramatic means by which a legislature can express itself. "Since the budget
is the principal instrument of resource allocation and policy planning, it
reflects state government's public policy priorities."
Id. (quoting PENNY MILLER, KENTUCKY POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: Do WE
STAND UNITED? 227 (1994) (citations omitted)).
" Cf. Stith, supra note 51, at 1345 (discussing separation of powers at the
federal level).
The Constitution presupposes a distinction between the public sphere and
the private sphere and permits expansion of the public sphere only with
legislative approval. The appropriations requirement both reflects and
implements these fundamental constitutional choices. In specifying the
activities on which public funds may be spent, the legislature defines the
contours of the federal government.
Id. Cf PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 72 (1991) (discussing
the use of non-appropriated funds in foreign policy).
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B. Text and Precedent
1. The United States
The power of the purse is a key aspect of separation of powers at the
federal level. It is articulated in the so-called "Appropriations Clause" of
the federal Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."56 The
people who praised, defended, and first expounded the Constitution laid
great stress on this provision and the principle underlying it. For example,
in exhorting the people of New York to ratify the federal Constitution,
Alexander Hamilton wrote that "[t]he legislature not only commands the
purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. 57 A few years later, James Madison noted in the House
of Representatives that "appropriations of money [are] of a high and sacred
character; [they are] the great bulwark which our Constitution [has]
carefully and jealously established against Executive usurpations.""8
The framers do not appear to have believed that Americans were perfect-
ible; nor did they believe that a democracy is composed of persons
committed above everything else to being good citizens. They knew that
most Americans were, and would remain, principally interested in their
homes, their families, their churches and other religious institutions, their
farms and businesses. Therefore the Constitution provides a crucial link
between the citizens of the democracy and the actions of the government in
a way that is calculated to engage the attention of a busy and preoccupied
people. That link is the oversight of how their money is being spent; this,
and not native virtue, was supposed to make the American people pay
attention to what was being done in their name.
Id.
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
58 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 377 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer
eds., 1987) (debate of Mar. 1, 1793); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the requirement that bills to raise
revenue must originate in the House).
They, in a word, hold the purse--that powerful instrument by which we
behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble
representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity
and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all
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Similarly, Justice Joseph Story noted that the "object" of the Appropria-
tions Clause
is to secure the regularity, punctuality, and fidelity, in the disbursements
of the public money. As all the taxes raised from the people, as well as the
revenues arising from other sources, are to be applied to the discharge of
the expenses, and debts, and other engagements of the government, it is
highly proper, that congress should possess the power to decide, how and
when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were
otherwise, the executive would possess an unbounded power over the
public purse of the nation; and might apply all its monied resources at his
pleasure. The power to control, and direct the appropriations, constitutes
a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and extravagance, as
well as upon corrupt influence and public peculation. In arbitrary
governments the prince levies what money he pleases from his subjects,
disposes of it, as he thinks proper, and is beyond responsibility or reproof.
It is wise to interpose, in a republic, every restraint, by which the public
treasure, the common fund of all, should be applied, with unshrinking
honesty to such objects, as legitimately belong to the common defence,
and the general welfare. Congress is made the guardian ofthis treasure. 
59
2. Kentucky
Section 230 of Kentucky's Constitution tracks the provision of the
federal Constitution to which Hamilton, Madison, and Story were
referring.6" The federal language provides that: "[n]o money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."'"
Section 230 provides that: "[n]o money shall be drawn from the State
the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This
power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate
representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.
Id.
" JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1342 (1833),
reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 378-79 (emphasis
added).
60 In fact, a provision along the lines of the federal Appropriations Clause can
be found in the constitutions of many states.
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law."62 It would
be hard to imagine two more similar provisions.63
The highest court of Kentucky has interpreted Section 230 with a fair
degree of strictness over the years, frequently recognizing the exclusive
role of the legislature in controlling the Commonwealth's finances. As the
Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins,
a decision handed down in 1986, "[i]t is clear that the power of the
dollar--he raising and expenditure of the money necessary to operate state
government-is one which is within the authority of the legislative branch
of government."'  The court similarly noted in Legislative Research
Commission v. Brown, a seminal case involving separation of powers in the
state, that "[t]he budget, which provides the revenue for the Commonwealth
and which determines how that revenue shall be spent, is fundamentally a
legislative matter. 65
In keeping with the strong command of Section 230, the court has
repeatedly refused to permit disbursements from the treasury beyond
appropriated amounts. For example, in Ferguson v. Oates, a 1958 decision,
the court refused to order the Commissioner of Finance to allocate
unappropriated funds from the treasury where the Attorney General
claimed that appropriations for his office were insufficient. 66 The court
noted that "in such cases the problem necessarily addresses itself to the
Legislature and should not be solved by a court order directing expendi-
tures of funds not appropriated to the uses of the department., 67 Similarly,
in Dishman v. Coleman, the court held the Treasurer and his surety liable
62 KY. CONST. § 230.
63 See generally Sheryl G. Snyder & Robert M. Ireland, The Separation of Gov-
ernmental Powers Under the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical
Analysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 KY. L.J. 165, 225 (1984) ("It is an axiom of
American government that the legislature holds the purse strings."). These writers
go on to note:
The federal and most state constitutions, for example, require that the
budget originate in the House of Representatives, the arm of government
most representative of the populace. This is traditionally viewed as the
means by which the representatives of the people hold their most powerful
check and balance upon the executive branch.
Id. (footnote omitted).
64 Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 709 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Ky.
1986).
65 Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 925 (Ky. 1984).
66 See Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Ky. 1958).
67Id.
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for payments made beyond the authority of appropriations by the legisla-
ture, noting that "[t]he discretion vested in the treasurer did not include the
right to increase any salaries fixed by statute, or to incur an expense beyond
the appropriation."68 Other decisions in this vein include Rhoads v. Fields,69
Hager v. Shuck,70 and Bosworth v. Shuck.71
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF SECTION 230
To be sure, the highest court of Kentucky has not interpreted Section
230 as an absolute bar to non-legislative disbursements from the treasury,
but the exception it has recognized tends more to prove the rule than to
undermine it. Specifically, the court will allow non-legislative disburse-
ments from the treasury to protect human life and property or to maintain
the specific essentials of government. It is also conceivable that the court
will allow spending without legislative approval where another, arguably
self-executing provision of the Constitution calls for the disbursement of
funds, but this possibility presents doctrinal problems and has never been
the rationale for a decision.
A. Preventing Disaster
In Miller v. Quertermous,72 the most famous (and perhaps only) case
in this category, the court addressed a situation in which appropriations by
the legislature for the construction, maintenance, and operation of the
68 Dishman v. Coleman, 50 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Ky. 1932).
69 Rhoads v. Fields, 292 S.W. 809, 810 (Ky. 1927) (commissioners of the
Sinking Fund of the Commonwealth could not be compelled to provide funds to
reconstruct a dormitory destroyed by fire without statutory authorization).
70 Hager v. Shuck, 87 S.W. 300, 301-02 (Ky. 1905) (auditor could not agree to
pay a clerk a salary that would obligate the Commonwealth beyond the amount
appropriated for that purpose by the General Assembly).
"' Bosworth v. Shuck, 81 S.W. 240, 241 (Ky. 1904) (warrant for the payment
of salary payable from a specific appropriation cannot exceed the unexhausted
amount of that appropriation); cf. Letter from Scott White, Assistant Deputy
Attorney General, to Representative Brent Yonts, at 3 (Aug. 20, 1999) (on file with
author) ("[I]t is the opinion of this Office that, absent a statutory provision
indicating otherwise, a state agency may not enter into [a Memorandum of
Agreement], or other contractual agreement, which extends beyond [a fiscal
biennium], regardless of the source ofthe contract's funding without approval from
the Legislature.").
72 Miller v. Quertermous, 202 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1947).
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state's hospitals and prisons had run out because price controls imposed
during the Second World War had been lifted unexpectedly. This created
what the court described as a "critical emergency-as a matter of fact a life
or death crisis. 73 At stake were the government's obligations not to release
its wards yet also to provide for their sustenance. In the words of the court,
the Commonwealth was faced with "an inexorable necessity coupled with
an inescapable responsibility."74 Against this backdrop, the court reasoned
that Section 230 "would not necessarily be so narrowly limited as to mean
that the Legislature has exclusive control" over appropriations. 75 Accord-
ingly, the court allowed mandamus against the state's Commissioner of
Finance and Treasurer, ordering them to make the necessary payments
beyond amounts previously appropriated by the legislature.76 In the course
of reaching this decision, the court emphasized that the legislature had
intended to provide funding for these needs but had failed to anticipate the
extent of the deficiency that would arise.77
The exact doctrinal basis for Quertermous is hard to discern, because
the court in that case seemed to rest its exception to exclusive legislative
control over appropriations on manifestly humanitarian concerns.78 Perhaps
the court was suggesting that the language of Section 230 is merely
precatory, but such a suggestion would have serious consequences for the
rule of law. If Section 230 were merely precatory, why would a court-or
any other department of the government--be precluded from ignoring other
provisions of the Constitution?
Three possible doctrinal grounds for Quertermous present themselves.
First, one might seek to explain Quertermous in terms of what the
Constitution expressly says about the support of prisoners. Section 254
requires the Commonwealth to "maintain control of the discipline, and
provide for all supplies, and for the sanitary condition of the convicts."79
Section 252 similarly requires the General Assembly to establish and
maintain institutions for youthful offenders.80 On this view, Quertermous
was correct because it implemented these sections of the Constitution. This
731 d. at 390.
74 Id.
751 d. at 391.
76 Id. at 392.
771 d. at 390.
78 See id. (noting that this action for mandamus was a "claim solely for the
purpose of feeding, clothing, housing, and providing for the attendants and guards
for the wards of the state, [and] no claim is entitled to a higher priority").
79 Ky. CONST. § 254.
'0 See id. § 252.
2003-2004]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
approach, however, cannot fully account for the holding in Quertermous,
which applied to wards other than prisoners. Second, one might argue that
the first two sections of Kentucky's Bill of Rights prevent the government
from taking individuals into custody and then depriving them of the means
of survival."' This has greater plausibility than the first theory because it
seems to account for the expenditures ordered in Quertermous. On the
other hand, depending upon its interpretation, this approach could fail to
account for other services that many would deem specific and essential but
that would not be necessary to maintain the welfare of individuals in
custody.82 Third, one might argue that legislative authorization to support
individuals in the government's custody is implicit in the very statutes
pursuant to which the state incarcerates or commits such individuals to its
facilities. This approach has the virtue of being faithful to Section 230 of
the Constitution, but it requires a degree of reading into statutes that one
would not want courts to use on a general basis.83 In short, no doctrinal
ground for Quertermous is perfect.
In any case, the facts of Quertermous were so extreme, and so
conducive to an exception to Section 230, that further litigation was
necessary to establish the contours of the notion it seemed to espouse. This
happened some eleven years later in the case of Ferguson v. Oates.84 In this
s See id. § 1.
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
Id.; see also id. § 2 ("Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest major-
ity.").
2 The first and second theories would also fail to explain precisely why certain
constitutional provisions, such as Sections 252 and 254, or Sections 1 and 2, would
control another provision of the same document, Section 230. Indeed, the entire
concept of judicially ordered disbursements from the treasury is conceptually
problematic. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 144-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
Anti-Deficiency Act, which prohibits federal officers from incurring obligations
against the United States in the absence of appropriations, "unless authorized by
law." 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l)(B). The Attorney General of the United States has
opined that this exception will not permit a federal agency to obligate the United
States on the mere strength of an organic statute charging it with a particular duty.
See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 4-5 (1981).
84 Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1958).
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case, the Attorney General sought mandamus to compel the Statutory Chief
of Finance to issue warrants sufficient to pay certain expenses for which the
legislature had made an appropriation that proved inadequate.85 The court
refused and took pains to distinguish Quertermous, describing the
circumstances of the earlier case as "most extreme" and admonishing that
Quertermous "should not be considered as precedent except under
comparable conditions."86
A case that preceded Quertermous and is similar to it in some respects
is Talbott v. Burke.87 In this case, the Treasurer refused to honor the warrant
of a county tax commissioner because of insufficient funds in the Treasury.
The court noted, however, that the General Assembly had expressly
authorized payment in a statute enacted after the budget went into effect.88
In this context, the court ordered payment on the warrant, noting that
"[h]ere we have a necessary governmental expense incurred under the
express authority of the legislature and a failure of the legislature, through
an error, to provide sufficient funds therefor."89
An appropriation also existed in Rhea v. Newman,90 another case that
preceded Quertermous. In Rhea, the legislature had appropriated money for
the state fair, but the Treasurer had refused to honor warrants presented by
the fair's chairman, claiming insufficient funds. The Treasurer had also
refused to endorse the warrants as interest-bearing notes, as required by
separate legislation, arguing that the state had already exceeded its limit on
casual debt under Section 49 of the Constitution. Ordering the Treasurer to
endorse the warrants, the court held that Section 49 does not automatically
preclude casual debt to defray costs for which an appropriation exists,
reasoning that "the validity of an appropriation of money by the Legislature
beyond the limit [set by Section 49] must depend in each case upon the
85See id. at 519.
861d. at 520. Professor Oberst and then-law student Tom Lewis made a similar
(and prescient) observation about the ultimate limitation of Quertermous in an
article published in 1953, six years after Quertermous and five years before
Ferguson. In this article, Professor Oberst and Mr. Lewis discussed claims against
the Commonwealth, and noted that, under the expansive dictum of Quertermous,
"[w]here the legislature fails, the court will step in." Paul Oberst & Thomas Lewis,
Claims Against the State of Kentucky, 42 KY. L.J. 65, 77 (1953). They went on to
say: "This thought, projected further (which it will not be), could provide a basis
for satisfying all claimants." Id. (emphasis added).
87 Talbott v. Burke, 152 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1941).
88 See id. at 587.
89 Id. at 588.
90 Rhea v. Newman, 156 S.W. 154 (Ky. 1913).
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character of the appropriation, or the manner of its payment." 91 In essence,
the court took the fairly reasonable position that the present-value of debt
is a function of the date on which the obligation is incurred, the date on
which it must be repaid, and the amount of principal and interest that
becomes due at any given time.92 Given the idiosyncratic nature of this
ruling, it would be difficult to extrapolate from Rhea a rule that Section 230
does not preclude non-legislative disbursements from the Treasury.
Putting to one side its facts and holding, Rhea also contains dictum that
could plausibly be described as hyperbolic, asking:
But should the Legislature fail in its plain duty under Section 171, by
refusing to levy any tax whatever, should the state cease to govern?
Would its courts of justice and its penal and charitable institutions close
their doors? Would its peace officers, for want of support, be compelled
to turn the state over to the passions of the lawless and vicious ele-
ments? . . . No one would hesitate to answer these questions in the
negative.
93
The Quertermous court picked up on this rhetoric and repeated it some
forty-four years later.94 But nothing in Rhea actually called this florid
language into play; the legislature had levied taxes. In any case, any
broader interpretation of this case would be fully subject to the limiting
construction imposed upon Quertermous by Ferguson v. Oates in
1958. 9'
Another case that appears to follow Querternous--at least by way of
dictum--is Jones v. Commonwealth.96 The issue in this case was whether
the court could order a county to pay for counsel to represent indigent
defendants in criminal prosecutions, notwithstanding lack of an appropria-
tion. Noting that the government has an independent constitutional
obligation to provide counsel to such individuals, the court characterized
the expense at issue in the case as "essential," citing Quertermous.97 The
court then concluded that it could order payment, although it ultimately
91 Id. at 159.
92Id. at 159-60.
93 Id. at 157.
4 See Miller v. Quertermous, 202 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Ky. 1947).
9' See Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Ky. 1958).
96 Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970).
97 Id. at 632.
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decided against doing so for practical reasons, including the difficulty of
assessing "reasonable" attorney's fees.98
Two other decisions that merit discussion are Fulton County Fiscal
Court v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.99 and First National
Bank of Manchester v. Hays.100 Fulton County Fiscal Court involved a
county emerging from a period of unlawful management by its fiscal
officers.'" In this context, the court allowed the county to incur debt in
excess of the limit set by Section 158 of the constitution in order to pay the
"compulsory obligations" of government, 0 2 which it defined as "essential
expenses."' 0'3 The court was careful to note, however, that not all evidences
of debt would qualify for payment: "Any money paid out and any
obligation assumed ... for non-essential matters was illegally paid and
assumed. And such outstanding obligations, being void, cannot be
funded."'04
In First National Bank of Manchester, taxpayers instituted suit to
determine the amount and validity of a county's debt in excess of limits set
by Section 158 after a fire had destroyed records. 5 The matter was
referred to a commissioner, who examined claims of indebtedness. The
circuit court overruled demurrers to the commissioner's report, stating:
"After a careful consideration of this voluminous record the Court has
reached the conclusion that only the expenditures remaining unpaid which
represent actual, indispensable government charges of the county can be
upheld and allowed as fundable in this case.
' 106
98 See id. Ironically, courts today routinely make such determinations. See, e.g.,
K.R.S. § 61.848(6) (Michie 1993) (authorizing the assessment of "reasonable
attorneys' fees" for willful violations of the Open Meetings Act).
Although the Jones Court cited Quertermous as authority, its observation that
the government has a constitutional obligation to provide counsel for indigent
accused obliquely suggested a distinct doctrinal basis for non-legislative
disbursements from the treasury-disbursements predicated directly on the
Constitution. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
possibility.
99 Fulton County Fiscal Court v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 146 S.W.2d 15 (Ky.
1940).
'0o First Nat'l Bank of Manchester v. Hays, 156 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1941).
'01 See Fulton County Fiscal Court, 146 S.W.2d at 25-26.
102 Id. at 24.
'0' Id. at 25.
'04 Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted).
'05 See First Nat"l Bank of Manchester, 156 S.W.2d at 122-23.
'o6 Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
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Arguably, Fulton County Fiscal Court and First National Bank of
Manchester do little more than confirm the limited nature of the exception
to Section 230 recognized in Quertermous. Indeed, the Quertermous court
cited Fulton County Fiscal Court.'°7 By limiting debt in excess of
constitutional limitations to the amount necessary to support the "compul-
sory obligations" and "essential expenses" of government, in the language
of Fulton County Fiscal Court,l1 8 or "indispensable government charges,"
in the language ofFirst National Bank ofManchester,°9 these cases simply
anticipated Quertermous, albeit in a different context.
In addition, any attempt to infer broad authority for non-legislative
disbursements from these cases would be squarely precluded by Ferguson
v. Oates, in which the court limited Section 230 to the context presented in
Quertermous. Moreover, these cases involved municipal corporations, in
which power may not be strictly divided among the branches of
government1 0 and whose fiscal affairs are necessarily more circumscribed
than those of a state, with less margin for error.111 Finally, these cases
involved a constitutional limitation on indebtedness, which does not
implicate separation of powers in the same way as a prohibition on non-
legislative disbursements from the Treasury. Public debt must be sold to
creditors who believe they will be repaid. Thus, the market will tend to
check extravagance in this area of policy. Unlawful disbursements from the
treasury are not subject to similar constraints."1 2
107 See Miller v. Quertermous, 202 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Ky. 1947).
108 Fulton County Fiscal Court, 146 S.W.2d at 24-25.
109 First Nat 'l Bank of Manchester, 156 S.W.2d at 123.
"o See Dierufv. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Health, 200 S.W.2d 300,
302 (Ky. 1947) (noting that Sections 27, 28, and 29 of the Constitution, which
strictly separate power between the three branches, "do not apply to municipal
governments").
I.. There is also some question as to whether any government would want to
emulate the practices of certain fiscal courts in bygone days. See Fulton County
Fiscal Court, 146 S.W.2d at 25-26.
..2 The Governor's spending plan of 2002-2003, for example, did not include
unappropriated disbursements to serve debt. See PAUL E. PATTON & JAMES R.
RAMSEY, EXPLANATION OF GOVERNOR PATTON's 2003 SPENDING PLAN 6 (2002)
("Four general categories of provisions contained in [the version of the budget that
passed the House in the Special Session of 2002] were determined to be excluded
from Governor Patton's fiscal year 2003 Spending Plan. These include . . .
[p]rovisions for the authorization and issuance of bonds.").
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B. Enforcing Arguably Self-Executing Provisions of the Constitution
After a review of precedent, one could reasonably conclude that the
courts of Kentucky will permit non-legislative disbursements from the
treasury only to prevent humanitarian disaster or to maintain the specific
essentials of government. On the other hand, nothing precludes a provision
of the constitution from directly requiring disbursements from the treasury,
and this possibility should at least be examined. At least in theory, the
framers and ratifiers of a Constitution could impose a direct duty upon the
government to pay for a particular public service. Although the idea of a
"self-executing" funding provision is problematic because of its implica-
tions for separation of powers and sovereign immunity,"13 it nevertheless
merits discussion.
Perhaps the most famous case illustrating this concept, albeit obliquely,
is Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. "4 In this case, the Kentucky
Supreme Court declared that the means by which Kentucky paid for its
primary and secondary schools was not "efficient" in the sense required by
Section 183 of the Constitution." 5 This section provides that "[t]he General
Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system
of common schools throughout the State. '16 If Section 183 had expressly
called for the disbursement of funds from the treasury, the court arguably
could have gone on from its conclusion to order the state's fiscal officers
to pay for an "efficient" system, but the language of Section 183 falls short
of expressly calling for the disbursement of funds, and the court did not
pursue this possibility. In fact, the state Supreme Court did not instruct the
legislature to take any particular action,"7 and issued no form of mandatory
relief whatever."i
8
Several provisions of the Constitution impose duties analogous to the
duty imposed by Section 183. These provisions include Section 220, which
"' See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
"" Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
... See id. at 215.
116 KY. CONST. § 183.
117 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 216 ("The General Assembly must provide
adequate funding for the [educational] system. How they do this is their deci-
sion."); see also id. at 214 (noting with approval that "the trial judge specifically
denied that he was directing the General Assembly to enact any specific legisla-
tion").
See id. at 215 ("We decline to issue any injunctions, restraining orders, writs
of prohibition or writs of mandamus.").
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pertains to the militia;" 9 Section 223, which pertains to military records
and paraphernalia; 120 Section 252, which pertains to youthful offenders;1
2
1
and Section 254, which pertains to adult offenders.122 In addition, Sections
14 and 120 appear to impose certain duties relative to the judiciary. Section
14 provides that: "All courts shall be open and every person for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial
or delay,"'123 and Section 120 provides that: "All justices and judges shall
be paid adequate compensation which shall be fixed by the General
Assembly. All compensation and necessary expenses of the Court of Justice
shall be paid out of the State Treasury. The compensation of a justice or
judge shall not be reduced during his term."'124 Close examination of these
provisions will reveal that none expressly calls for the disbursement of
funds from the treasury without authority from the Legislature, although
each imposes a general duty that cannot be discharged without the
expenditure of money. 125 Taken to their logical extremes, each of these
1" See Ky. CONST. § 220 ("The General Assembly shall provide for maintain-
ing an organized militia.").
120 See id. § 223 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the safekeeping of
the public arms, military records, relics and banners of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.").
.2' See id. § 252.
122 See id. § 254 (requiring the Commonwealth to "maintain control of the
discipline, and provide for all supplies, and for the sanitary condition of the
convicts").
123 Id. § 14.
124 1d. § 120.
125 For an interesting analysis of how a constitutional funding provision can be
self-executing, see White v. Davis, 108 Cal. App. 4th 197, 216-23 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (determining whether certain provisions of a state constitution require
disbursements from the treasury without appropriations). Although the Supreme
Court of California reviewed the Court of Appeal's decision in White, it left
standing this aspect of the lower court's decision, and ordered its opinion
published. See White v. Davis, 68 P.3d 74, 98 n. 14 (Cal. 2003). In this case, the
Court of Appeal concluded that a provision of California's Constitution relating to
funding for education was not self-executing such that the state's controller had to
pay out funds without legislative authority. See White, 108 Cal. App. 4th at 221.
The court reasoned that, because the provision at issue set forth only a minimum
level of funding, it left implementation to the legislature.
[T]he provisions ofCalifornia Constitution, article XVI, section 8, although
mandatory, simply establish the parameters of the principle enunciated and
leave the specific means by which it is to be achieved for the people of
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provisions would arguably support a judicial order requiring the expendi-
ture of public funds without legislative approval.
But the idea of such a provision is doctrinally problematic, given its
implications for separation of powers and sovereign immunity. In truth, no
provision of a constitution can ever be "self-executing" in the sense that it
enforces itself, and a "self-executing" provision of law is actually just a
provision that can be enforced directly by the courts without an affirmative
act by the legislature. On the other hand, the idea of a court ordering money
released from the treasury is something of a historical and theoretical
anomaly. As Alexander Hamilton famously noted in The Federalist No. 78:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each
other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will
be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.... The judiciary.. . has no
influence over either the sword or the purse. 
126
At least in theory, the concepts of separated powers and sovereign
immunity preclude the idea of a judgment against the state absent consent
by the legislature and an appropriation sufficient to satisfy the judgment. 27
California... to the Legislature. We therefore conclude that they do not
constitute a self-executing authorization to disburse funds.
See id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). The court went
on, however, to hold that another provision of the state's constitution pertaining to
educational funding was self-executing. See id. at 223; see also id. at 222 (quoting
Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Hayes, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1513, 1530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
The measure is self-executing; it requires no legislative action.... Section
8.5 does not extend the Legislature's spending power to excess revenues;
rather it imposes a self-executing, ministerial duty upon the Controller to
transfer such excess revenues to a restricted portion of the school fund and
thence to allocate such revenues to school districts and community college
districts on a per-enrollment basis. Section 8.5 specifically restricts the
purposes for which those funds may be expended.
Id. (discussing article XVI, § 8.5 of the California Constitution) (ellipsis added by
the White court).
126 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
127 See Calvert Invs., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist.,
805 S.W.2d 133, 138 (Ky. 1991) (Palmore, J., dissenting) ("[A]s duty requires, we
defer to the sovereign immunity of the central state government mandated by §§
230 and 231 of the Constitution, but we reject extending sovereign immunity
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In light of this analysis, the Rose court appropriately refrained from
issuing any mandatory orders in that case. At any rate, even if the
constitution did contain a handful of self-executing funding provisions, the
enumeration of these obligations presupposes something not enumerated.
Otherwise Section 230 would stand for nothing, and the fundamentally
legislative character of the appropriating process would be lost. Indeed, in
a 1985 opinion taking into account both Quertermous v. Miller and Jones
v. Commonwealth, the Attorney General of Kentucky drew the following
important conclusion:
Miller [v. Quertermous] and Jones... seem to instruct that if the General
Assembly has not made an appropriation for the particular purpose in
question, then only in those rare instances when it is determined that the
particular item constitutes an essential or necessary governmental function
or expense will the court consider a judicial order for payment from state
funds.
2 8
C. "Non-Exceptions" to Section 230
In addition, reference must be made to two important "non-exceptions"
to Section 230. As noted earlier, this section requires legislative authority
for disbursements from the treasury, but it does not require the legislature
to use magic words, nor does it require the legislature to appropriate money
only via omnibus acts covering a fiscal biennium. Instead, the General
Assembly is at liberty to effect an appropriation however it chooses and to
appropriate money on a no-year or multi-year basis. In Commonwealth ex
rel. Meredith v. Johnson, for example, the court sustained a broad dele-
beyond "what the Constitution demands." (quoting Cullinan v. Jefferson County,
418 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1967))). Section 231 provides that "The General
Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits may be
brought against the Commonwealth." KY. CONST. § 231. See generally Mark J.
Coleman, Mandel v. Myers: Judicial Encroachment on Legislative Spending
Powers, 70 CAL. L. REv. 932, 953 (1982) ("[T]o the extent that the doctrine [of
sovereign immunity] acts as a check on violations of the separation of powers, it
remains vital. Modem sovereign immunity protects the powers and immunities of
the separate branches of government, reflecting the constitution's allocation of
power among the three branches.").
128 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-132, at 5-6 (1985). The Attorney General did not
refer to this opinion in his letter to the Governor's Counsel of April 25, 2002. See
Letter from Albert B. Chandler III & Ryan M. Halloran, to Denis Fleming, supra
note 23.
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gation of authority from the General Assembly to the Governor to expend
appropriated funds for emergencies. 129 The Attorney General argued that
the legislature's express delegation of discretion to the Executive was too
broad, but the court disagreed, reasoning that the legislature has leeway to
determine the form that appropriations will take.130
D. The Governor's Inherent Powers
Finally, one must pay attention to the question of whether the Gover-
nor's inherent powers under the constitution somehow limit the scope of
Section 230. With support from the Attorney General, the Governor argued
in 2002 that his inherent powers and duties as chief executive provided
authority for the spending plan.' As he and Budget Director James R.
Ramsey argued in support of the plan:
It is not in the best interests of the people of Kentucky to operate state
government with an undefined "continuation" spending program nor is it
in the best interest of the people to shut down government services totally
or partially. Kentucky state government provides a myriad of needed
services to its people; the delivery of these services and the day-to-day
operation of state government is important to the health and well-being of
our citizens and to the economic prosperity of the state. 1
32
Nevertheless, the constitutional dimension of this argument is difficult to
sustain.
Specifically, the Governor argued that the aggregate of powers vested
in him by virtue of Sections 69 and 81 of the constitution permitted him to
adopt a comprehensive spending plan. 13 3 But close inspection of these
129 Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v. Johnson, 166 S.W.2d. 409, 415 (Ky.
1942).
130 See id. at 414 ("It will be observed that [the language of Section 230] does
not undertake to prescribe the form to be used in making appropriations nor does
it require that appropriations shall be detailed, definite, or specific."); see also Ky.
Op. Att'y Gen. Nos. 74-863, 74-600 (1974).
131 See Exec. Order No. 2002-727 para. 6, at 4 (June 26, 2002); Letter from
Albert B. Chandler III & Ryan M. Halloran, to Denis Fleming, supra note 23.
132 PATTON & RAMSEY, supra note 112, at 1.
1
33 See Exec. Order No. 2002-727 para. 6, at 4 ("The authority of the Governor,
pursuant to Sections 69 and 81 of the Kentucky Constitution, to cause the
expenditure from the State Treasury of such available funds as may be necessary
for the operation of government and the execution of laws of the Commonwealth
is hereby recognized.").
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provisions strongly indicates that the Governor misapprehended the scope
of authority the constitution vests in his office.
Section 69, one of the provisions the Governor cited, is the Executive
Vesting Clause: "The supreme executive power of the Commonwealth shall
be vested in a Chief Magistrate, who shall be styled the 'Governor of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. ' ' 13 4 Like analogous clauses vesting
legislative power in the General Assembly and judicial power in the Court
of Justice,"' this section begs the question, in that it simply vests a certain
power in a particular branch of government without specifying the
attributes of that power. Even if certain powers are vested exclusively in the
Governor, it still does not follow that he possesses powers assigned to the
other two branches of government. 1
3 6
The other constitutional provision cited by the Governor, Section 81,
offers relatively little additional support. This section provides that the
Governor "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."137 Although
this section certainly supports the argument that the Governor may not
ignore laws that impose a duty upon him, it too begs the question in that it
assumes that the Governor has authority to go beyond the specific duties
imposed by law and to cause public funds to be drawn from the treasury in
the absence of appropriations. Indeed, one may note that Section 230 of the
constitution, which forbids non-legislative disbursements, and K.R.S.
section 41.110, which implements Section 230, are among the laws that the
Governor is bound to execute.
134 Ky. CONST. § 69.
"' See id. § 29 (Legislative Vesting Clause); id. § 109 (Judicial Vesting
Clause).
136 Indeed, under Kentucky's Constitution, the crossing of lines in the exercise
of power is expressly prohibited. See id. § 28 ("No person or collection of persons,
being one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to
either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or
permitted."). See also Exparte Auditor of Pub. Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 684-85
(Ky. 1980) (referring to Kentucky's "unusually forceful" separation of power); see
generally ROBERT M. IRELAND, THE KENTUCKY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFER-
ENCE GUIDE 48 (1999) (describing separation of powers as "one of the most
significant legacies of the American Revolution," and noting that Thomas
Jefferson, "[o]ne of the most zealous proponents of the doctrine," wrote the
original versions of Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution). Section 27
begins: "The powers of the government ... shall be divided into three distinct
departments, and each of them shall be confined to a separate body of magistry."
KY. CONST. § 27.
3 7 KY. CONST. § 81.
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An instructive federal case in this regard is Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.' 38 This case involved an attempt by the President of the
United States to seize certain steel mills to prevent a strike during the
Korean War. The President did not purport to rely on any statutory
authority to seize the mills. 39 Instead, he defended his actions solely in
terms of the aggregate of his implied powers under the federal Constitu-
tion-which in his case included the federal Executive Vesting, Take Care,
and Commander-in-Chief Clauses.'40
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected each of these grounds
for justifying the seizures. The Commander-in-Chief Clause, it held, could
not be read so broadly as to permit seizure of domestic industries outside
the theater of war.' 4' With regard to the Executive Vesting and Take Care
Clauses, the Court reasoned as follows:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.
The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks
bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first
article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States."' 42
138 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
9 See id. at 585.
140 See id. at 587.
"' See id. ("This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military
authorities."). In his motion for summary judgment, the Treasurer obliquely
referred to the Governor's authority as commander-in-chief of the militia as a
justification for the spending plan. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff
Department of the Treasury's Motion for Summary Judgment at 15-18 (on file with
author), Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28. This argument would be difficult
to sustain, however, for much the same reason that President Truman's similar
argument failed in Youngstown. Although the Governor commands the militia, see
KY. CONST. § 75, his authority to do so is fully subject to the Constitution, which
allocates the power of the purse to the General Assembly. See Franks v. Smith, 134
S.W. 484, 492 (Ky. 1911).
[A]ny military order, whether it be given by the Governor of the state or an
officer of the militia or a civil officer of a city or county, that attempts to
invest either officer or private with authority in excess of that which may be
exercised by peace officers of the state is unreasonable and unlawful.
Id.
142 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
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The teaching of Youngstown undermines defense of the spending plan. At
bottom, this defense rested on the assumption that execution of every law
on the books required continuing, comprehensive appropriations, notwith-
standing other laws and precedent that limit the appropriating power to the
legislature, absent a need to pay for specific and essential public services.
Although grounded in good intentions, the Governor's defense of the plan
misapprehended the system of separated power and the precedential basis
for disbursements from the treasury in the absence of appropriations."'
The next part of this Article reviews learned opinion of officials in
other jurisdictions who have wrestled with the problem of gaps in
appropriations. This review supports the conclusion that a comprehensive,
non-legislative spending plan violates separation of powers.
IV. LEARNED OPINIONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A jurisdiction facing an unusual and difficult situation, such as a gap
in appropriations, is always well advised to seek guidance from other
jurisdictions that may have addressed the issue. As it turns out, attorneys
general in at least three jurisdictions-the United States and the states of
Tennessee and Connecticut-have opined on the proper scope of govern-
mental activities if the legislature fails to enact appropriations on a timely
basis. Review of these opinions reveals a relatively high degree of
formalism, that is, adherence to text, precedent, and the fundamental rules
of government by separated power.
143 In his motion for summary judgment, the Treasurer also argued that K.R.S.
chapter 39A, which enables certain functions of government in the case of
emergency, supported the spending plan. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff
Department of the Treasury's Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Spending Plan
Litigation, supra note 28 (citing K.R.S. ch. 39A (Michie 1998 & 2002 Supp.)). At
first impression, this argument is plausible, if one construes the term "emergency"
to include a gap in funding. But this is not the case. In K.R.S. § 39A.010, the
General Assembly defines the kinds of events that would justify the use of
emergency powers in classic terms of natural disaster, civil disorder, or actual war.
A gap in funding does not constitute such an emergency, and any catch-all phrase
found in these chapters must be read in the context of the maxim that "when a
general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word
or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as
those listed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ejusdem
generis). See Robinson v. Ehrler, 691 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Ky. 1985).
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A. The United States
1. Background
Article I of the federal Constitution provides that "[n]o money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law."' 144 Although no direct action has ever been brought on the federal
Appropriations Clause, this clause is substantially implemented by the
Anti-Deficiency Act, which has been the subject of litigation for the most
part not relevant to this Article. In addition to having been the focus of
litigation, however, this Act has also been the focus of numerous opinions
of the Attorney General of the United States. Additionally, this Act has
been the subject of memoranda written by various other executive officials,
and many of these opinions and memoranda pertain specifically to the
validity of disbursements from the treasury in the absence of appropria-
tions.'45
Perhaps the most famous opinion in this regard was written by Attorney
General Benjamin R. Civiletti in the last month of the Carter Administra-
tion. In late September 1980, it appeared that Congress was not going to
enact most of the regular appropriations bills or a continuing resolution to
cover the period between regular appropriations. 46 Under these circum-
stances, General Civiletti approved certain "guidance" in the form of a
'44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
' See, e.g., Authority for the Continuance of Government Functions During
a Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1 (1981)
(discussed infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text); Applicability of the
Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in an Agency's Appropriation, 40p. Off. Legal
Counsel 16 (1980) (regarding the Federal Trade Commission); 30 Op. Att'y Gen.
157 (1913) (regarding the authority of the Postmaster General to employ auxiliary
services beyond appropriations); Support of the Army, 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 209
(1877) (regarding the use of private contributions to support the army during an
absence in appropriations for that purpose); Effect of Appropriations for Other
Agencies and Branches on the Authority to Continue Department of Justice
Functions During the Lapse in the Department's Appropriations, Mem. Op. for the
Attorney General, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 337 (1995); Participation in
Congressional Hearings During an Appropriations Lapse, Mem. Op. for the
Attorney General, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 301 (1995); Authority to Employ the
Services of White House Office Employees During an Appropriations Lapse,
Mem. Op. for the Counsel to the President, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 235 (1995).
146 See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 1 (1981). The fiscal year for the federal
government begins on October 1. See id.
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memorandum that was provided to the directors of the various units of the
federal government on September 30, 1980. When the dust settled from that
particular situation, President Carter asked General Civiletti for "a close
and more precise analysis of the issues raised by the September 30
memorandum."' 47
General Civiletti presented his analysis to the President on January 16,
1981, just before President Carter left office. The essential burden of this
opinion was that, upon an expiration of appropriations, officers and
employees of the federal government may continue to incur liabilities, but
only to the extent permitted by two sections of the Anti-Deficiency Act,
now codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1342.148 General Civiletti analyzed
these sections one at a time.
a. 31 U.S.C. § 1341
In its present form, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 provides in pertinent part that:
(a)(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the
District of Columbia government may not-
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an
amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure
or obligation; [or]
(B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the
payment of money before an appropriation is made unless
authorized by law.1
49
Attorney General Civiletti began his treatment of this section by noting
that it confirmed the basic rule that payments from the treasury require
appropriations. 50 He then went on to discuss the section's exception for
obligations in advance of appropriations "authorized by law." The issue
with respect to this exception was whether an agency's broad statutory
authority to carry out a particular program, such as the Post Office's
authority to deliver the mail, constitutes an obligation "authorized by law."
His answer was essentially in the negative:
147Id.
148 They were then codified at 31 U.S.C. § 665(a), (b). See id.
'4931 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003) (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1950))
(emphasis added).
50 See 5Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 2 (discussing 40p. Off. Legal Counsel 16
(1980)).
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[S]tatutory authority to incur obligations in advance of appropriations may
be implied as well as express, but may not ordinarily be inferred, in the
absence of appropriations,from the kind of broad, categorical authority,
standing alone, that often appears,for example, in the organic statutes of
government agencies. The authority must be necessarily inferrable from
the specific terms of those duties that have been imposed upon, or of
those authorities that have been invested in, the officers or employees [in
question]. 
151
He went on to add:
This rule prevails even though the obligation of funds that the official
contemplates may be a reasonable means for fulfilling general responsibil-
ities that Congress has delegated to the official in broad terms, but without
conferring specific authority to enter into contracts or otherwise obligate
funds in advance of appropriations.
152
In other words, General Civiletti concluded that, in the main, executive
agencies may not rely upon organic legislation vesting them with broad
responsibilities as a ground for obligating the United States in advance of
appropriations. Instead, they need to find fairly specific or particularized
statutory authority to incur an obligation before they may do so without an
express appropriation.
The Attorney General then went on to address certain issues pertaining
to the President's constitutional status as the chief executive officer of the
United States. Specifically, General Civiletti reasoned that the President
may have enhanced authority to obligate the federal government "in
connection with initiatives that are grounded in the peculiar institutional
powers and competency of the President,"'153 which he refused to define. 1
54
Although this aspect of the opinion has been reasonably criticized by at
least one commentator,155 General Civiletti indicated that the degree of
statutory authority for the obligation at issue is highly relevant to its
validity, even in the context of the President's "peculiar institutional
powers and competency," echoing Justice Jackson's famous concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
156
... Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
152 Id. at 4-5.
I53 ld. at 6-7.
'54 See id. at 7.
t See Feld, supra note 1, at 982-86.
156 See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 6-7 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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b. 31 U.S.c. § 1342
In its present form, 31 U.S.C. § 1342 provides in pertinent part:
An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the
District of Columbia government may not accept voluntary services for
either government or employ personal services exceeding that authorized
by law except for emergencies involving the safety of human life or the
protection of property.... As used in this section, the term "emergencies
involving the safety of human life or the protection of property" does not
include ongoing, regular functions of government the suspension of which
would not imminently threaten the safety of human life or the protection
of property.
157
The main issue with regard to this section was the extent of the exception
for "emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of
property." General Civiletti interpreted this exception to permit a relatively
limited category of services to continue to be provided by the federal
government during a gap in funding, provided the following two-part test
was satisfied.
First, there must be some reasonable and articulable connection between
the function to be performed and the safety of human life or the protection
of property. Second, there must be some reasonable likelihood that the
safety of human life or the protection of property would be compromised,
in some degree, by delay in the performance of the function in question. 1
58
The Attorney General also reasoned, in connection with his interpretation
of this section, that Congress would expect federal employees to be able to
procure, even without appropriations, the necessary equipment to carry out
the functions contemplated by the exception. 59 To illustrate this point,
General Civiletti opined that Congress, "having allowed the government to
hire firefighters[,] must surely have intended that water and firetrucks be
available to them."'
160
' 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2003) (formerly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 665(b) (1950)).
At the time the Attorney General rendered his opinion, the last sentence of this
section was not present. Congress added it in 1990. See Act of Nov. 5, 1990, P.L.
101-508, Title XIII, Subtitle B, § 13213(b), 104 Stat. 1388-621 (amending 31
U.S.C. § 1342 (1982)).
"' 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 8.
5 9 Id. at 11.
160 id.
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In 1990, Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 1342 to clarify that it intended
the exception for emergencies to be narrow. 61 As a consequence, the
Department of Justice revisited its interpretation of the exception set forth
in § 1342. In a memorandum submitted to Alice Rivlin, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, on August 16, 1995-just before a
significant gap in appropriations at the federal level-Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General, opined that exceptions to this section should
satisfy the following slightly modified test:
First, there must be some reasonable and articulable connection between
the function to be performed and the safety of human life or the protection
of property. Second, there must be some reasonable likelihood that the
safety of human life or the protection of property would be compromised,
in some [significant] degree, by delay in the performance of the function
in question. 1
62
2. Implications for Kentucky
The insight of the Civiletti Opinion and its progeny is remarkably apt
for Kentucky for three distinct reasons. First, the Appropriations Clause of
the federal Constitution and Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution are
almost identical. Second, although Kentucky has no law completely
analogous to the federal Anti-Deficiency Act, it does have a number of
provisions in K.R.S. chapter 45, the chapter on budget and financial
administration, which limit disbursements from the treasury to amounts and
purposes specified by the General Assembly, much like the federal
legislation. K.R.S. section 45.229, for example, will not permit an officer
to obligate funds appropriated for a particular fiscal year after that year has
expired.'63 Similarly, K.R.S. section 45.242 will not permit an officer to
161 Act of Nov. 5, 1990, P.L. 101-508, Title XIII, Subtitle B, § 13213(b), 104
Stat. 1388-621 (amending 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982) ("As used in this section, the
term 'emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property'
does not include ongoing, regular functions of government the suspension of which
would not imminently threaten the safety of human life or the protection of
property.")).
162 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Alice
Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget (Aug. 16, 1995) (on file with
author).
163 See K.R.S. § 45.229(1) (Michie 1997).
No state officer or budget unit shall, after the close of any fiscal year, incur,
or vote, order, or approve the incurring of, any obligation or expenditure
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obligate the state beyond the unencumbered balance of an allotment.'
K.R.S. section 45.244, in turn, reiterates that officers may not obligate the
government beyond appropriations, and provides that any purported
obligation in the absence of appropriations does not bind the government.'65
Finally, K.R.S. section 45.25 1, echoing K.R.S. section 41.110, provides
that "[e]xpenditures shall be limited to the amounts and purposes for which
appropriations are made."'" Third, although the Civiletti Opinion and its
progeny tend to display some degree of institutional bias in favor of the
executive, 67 their interpretation of the federal Anti-Deficiency Act tends
under any appropriation for that fiscal year, and no expenditure shall be
made from or charged to any appropriation for any fiscal year that has
expired at the time the obligation of the expenditure was incurred.
Id. See also KENTUCKY MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE K.R.S. § 45A.145(1)
("Unless otherwise provided in the statute making appropriations therefor,
multiyear contracts for supplies and services may be entered into for periods not
extending beyond the end of the biennium in which the contract was made."). The
negative implication of K.R.S. § 45A.145--that officers and employees of the
Commonwealth may not obligate public funds beyond the end of a fiscal
biennium-was expressly recognized in a letter from the Office of the Attorney
General dated August 20, 1999. See Letter from Scott White, Assistant Attorney
General, to Representative Brent Yonts, supra note 71.
64 See K.R.S. § 45.242 (Michie 2001 Cum. Supp.).
No head of a budget unit or assistant designated by him shall approve any
advice of employment, purchase order, contract requisition for reservation
of funds, or letter of travel authorization request for travel outside of
Kentucky that will involve an expenditure of any sum in excess of the
unencumbered balance of the allotment to which the resulting expenditure
will be chargeable.
Id.
165 See K.R.S. § 45.244 (Michie 1997).
Except as expressly authorized in this chapter, no person shall incur, or
order or vote to incur, any obligation against the Commonwealth in excess
of, or any expenditure not authorized by, an appropriation of the General
Assembly and an allotment of funds provided by KRS Chapter 48. Any
such obligation so incurred shall not be binding against the Commonwealth,
and shall be void and incapable of ratification by any administrative
authority of the Commonwealth.
Id.
16 6 See K.R.S. § 45.251(1) (Michie 1997). For the text of K.R.S. § 41.110, see
supra note 8.
167 See Feld, supra note 1, at 972-73 ("Unfortunately, the legal analysis of the
1981 OAG reflects the clear institutional stake of the executive branch in the
outcome, so as to flaw the result.").
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to corroborate the limited exceptions to Section 230 that the highest court
of Kentucky has recognized. Thus, the exception for services reasonably
necessary to save human life or to protect property set forth in 31 U.S.C. §
1342 and analyzed by the various authorities discussed above reflects the
teaching of such cases as Miller v. Quertermous.'68 In addition, although
the exception recognized by General Civiletti for obligations arising
directly from the President's "peculiar institutional powers and compe-
tency" has no direct analog in Kentucky case law, the Governor could find
authority to spend money for his or her comparable powers in the dictum
of Jones v. Commonwealth, where the court brought the government's
constitutional obligation to pay for counsel for indigent accused under the
umbrella of Quertermous169 Finally, the exception set forth in § 1341 of the
Anti-Deficiency Act for obligations in advance of appropriations "autho-
rized by law" simply reflects what has been described as a "non-exception"
to Section 230-an instance in which the General Assembly has authorized
executive officials to incur an obligation outside the concept of a conven-
tional appropriation.'70
One notable difference between Quertermous and the exceptions to the
Anti-Deficiency Act is that Quertermous will permit actual disbursements
from the treasury without appropriations to pay for specific, essential
services, whereas the federal law will only permit officials to incur
obligations, with actual disbursements having to await an act of
Congress. 7 ' Given the fairly strict limits on the Commonwealth's ability
168 Miller v. Quertermous, 202 S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1947) (requiring disbursements
from the Treasury to pay for certain essential public services).
169 See Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970). Of course, it must
be borne in mind that the Governor would lack constitutional authority to construe
his powers in such a manner as to usurp the authority of another branch of
government. See KY. CONST. § 28. See generally Snyder & Ireland, supra note 63,
at 207 n.213.
[T]here are two types of separation of powers cases: (1) cases in which one
branch of government usurps powers properly belonging to another branch
of government; and (2) cases in which one branch of government exercises
powers properly belonging to it, but encroaches upon the responsibilities of
a coequal branch of government in the course of exercising its rightful
powers.
Id. 70 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
' See Authority to Employ the Services of White House Office Employees
During an Appropriations Lapse, Mem. Op. for the Counsel to the President, 19
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 235, 236 (1995) ("To reiterate, employees who perform
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to contract casual debt, 172 as well as the short duration of the General
Assembly's sessions,' however, this makes sense.
B. Tennessee
1. Background
Tennessee is another jurisdiction that has wrestled with the issue of
whether and to what extent the government may operate after appropria-
tions expire. In fact, on July 1, 2002, Tennessee found itself in roughly the
same circumstances as Kentucky. A new fiscal year had begun, but the
legislature had not enacted a budget. Unlike the Governor of Kentucky,
however, the Governor of Tennessee did not adopt a comprehensive
spending plan. Indeed, had the legislature of that state not enacted the
"Essential Government Services Act of 2002,"'174 it is not clear that the state
would have had any authority to pay its employees.
75
The same basic restrictions apply to the fiscal operations of government
in Tennessee as in Kentucky, with the exception that Tennessee appears to
lack precedent along the lines of Quertermous. Like Section 230 of the
Kentucky Constitution and the federal Appropriations Clause, the
Tennessee Constitution provides that "[n]o public money shall be expended
except pursuant to appropriations made by law."' 76 Similarly, like K.R.S.
§ 41.110, a provision of the Tennessee code reiterates the constitutional
excepted functions may not be paid until appropriations are enacted.").
172 See KY. CONST. § 49.
See id. § 36(l) ("The General Assembly, in odd-numbered years, shall meet
in regular session for a period not to exceed a total of thirty (30) legislative days.");
id. § 42 ("[N]or shall a session occurring in odd-numbered years extend beyond
March 30; nor shall a session of the General Assembly continue beyond sixty
legislative days, nor shall it extend beyond April 15.").
"' See Richard Locker & Paula Wade, Tennessee Goes into Partial Shutdown;
Lawmakers Fail to Settle Budget Crisis; 22,000 Face Furloughs, COM. APPEAL,
July 1, 2002, at Al.
"' See Tom Sharp, Tenn. Faces 'Many Lawsuits' if a Budget Isn't Passed,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), June 14, 2002, at B2 ("If lawmakers do not pass
a balanced budget by the state constitutional deadline of July l, the state will be 'in
a financial mess of monumental proportions,' Atty. Gen. Paul Summers told the
House Finance Committee on Thursday .... Without an appropriations bill,
Summers said, the state cannot legally spend any money. It could not honor its
contracts or pay its employees.").
176 TENN. CONST. art. II, § 24.
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provision limiting the power of the purse to the legislature.'77 In accordance
with this precedent, Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, has
issued two opinions confirming that the power to appropriate funds from
the treasury lies exclusively in the legislature, emphasizing that the
government may not spend money after appropriations expire. In his
opinion of May 4, 2000, when the state was facing the possibility of a gap
in appropriations, he stated:
Our Office has concluded in the past that, absent the enactment of an
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, there is no authority for the
State of Tennessee to spend money as of the beginning of the next fiscal
year. The appropriations act for fiscal year 1999-2000 reflects no general
intent to make appropriations for any subsequent year.... Therefore, as
a general matter, absent the enactment of an appropriations bill for fiscal
year 2000-200 1, there will be no authority in most circumstances for the
State of Tennessee to spend money.1
78
Attorney General Summers went on to opine, however, that the various
agencies of the government could continue to perform their statutory duties,
notwithstanding the absence of funding, unless the statutes imposing those
duties expressly prohibited performance absent appropriations:
The duties and responsibilities of the various state agencies are set forth
in general statutes, and not in the appropriations act. As a result, unless it
is expressly forbidden by statute, these agencies may continue to carry out
these duties and responsibilities regardless of whether an appropriations
act has been enacted. But the money that may be expended to support
these activities is subject to the limitations discussed [previously]. 79
In other words, upon the expiration of appropriations, employees of the
state may perform statutory duties, but only as volunteers.'
8 0
' See TENN. CODE A.. § 9-4-601 (a) (1999) ("No money shall be drawn from
the state treasury except in accordance with appropriations duly authorized by
law.").
78 Failure to Enact Appropriations Act, Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 00-083, at
4 (2000) (citation omitted).
79 Id. at 5.
180 Lee Anderson, A Tennessee Budget Nonoption, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, May 11, 2002, at B7 (quoting from General Summers' testimony regarding
a gap in appropriations before a committee of the legislature: "All state functions
and services would shut down. Why? No employees. There is no legal authority to
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As it turns out, Tennessee did not experience a gap in appropriations
in 2000,"'1 but it did in the summer of 2002. On March 15, 2002, General
Summers issued a second opinion, largely reiterating his opinion of two
years before, except for taking into account legislation that had been
enacted in the intervening period that provided for certain continuing
appropriations.1 2 General Summers later testified directly to a committee
of the legislature, noting that, if the state entered the new fiscal year
without a budget,
[a]ll state functions and services would shut down.... No one guards the
prisons. No one patrols the highways. No one treats the patients in state
hospitals. No one serves the mentally ill. No one processes child support
payments. No one handles TennCare applications and payments. No one
teaches summer classes in state schools. No one assists the appellate
judges. These are just the tip of the iceberg.... Everything the state does
stops cold.1
8 3
On the eve of the new fiscal year, the General Assembly of Tennessee
enacted emergency legislation appropriating funds for essential public
services for a period of five days.8 4 Within a few days, the legislature
enacted a comprehensive budget for the state.8 5
make them come to work without pay.").
18' See Bonna M. de la Cruz, Budget Fight Ends Without New Taxes,
TENNESSEAN (Nashville, Tenn.), June 29,2000, at IA ("The state legislature ended
one of its longest sessions in history yesterday with a budget that includes no new
taxes but raises prospects of another round of debate over tax changes later this
year or early in 2001.").
182 See Failure to Adopt a Budget, Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 02-034 (2002).
13 Pat Wilcox, What if the State Shuts Down?, CHATrANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, May 11, 2002, at B6 (setting forth excerpts from Attorney General
Summers' testimony).
'84 See Lindsay Riddell, Most College Workers Off Job, CHATTANOOGA TIMES
FREE PRESS, July 1, 2002, at Al ("Area workers were among the 22,000 state
employees the Sundquist administration began calling Sunday to tell them not to
show up for work this week."); id. ("The notification is part of a five-day partial
shutdown that would limit state government to essential services, such as highway
patrol, prisons, mental health, child support and TennCare."); id. ("The House and
Senate approved Sunday night the emergency appropriations bill."); id. ("Gov. Don
Sundquist was expected to sign the bill by midnight Sunday.").
i85 See Michael Finn, State Breaks Budget Impasse-Tax Increase Largest in
History, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, July 4, 2002, at Al.
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2. Implications for Kentucky
When asked to opine on the fiscal activities of government if appropria-
tions expire, the Attorney General of Tennessee, much like the Attorney
General of the United States, issued a formalist opinion confirming that the
power of the purse lies in the legislature. Indeed, unlike U.S. Attorney
General Civiletti, Tennessee Attorney General Summers did not even
recognize an exception for essential services, presumably because the
legislature of Tennessee has not authorized such expenditures, nor have the
courts of Tennessee issued an opinion along the lines of Quertermous. But
the position taken by the Governor of Kentucky in 2002 was decidedly
nonformalist because, not only did it ignore the general rule set forth in
Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution, but it also went far beyond any
fair reading of the authority conferred by Quertermous, especially as
limited by Ferguson v. Oates."6 Of course, it can be argued that Tennessee
had to resolve its budgetary impasse because it faced an enormous shortfall
in revenue,' 7 but the position taken by the Attorney General of that state
was clearly predicated on the rule of law, not on political expedience.
C. Connecticut
1. Background
An opinion issued by the Attorney General of Connecticut in 1991
plows many of the same fields as the Civiletti Opinion of 1981, although
the authority with which the Attorney General of Connecticut was working
was slightly different. Unlike the Constitutions of the United States and
Tennessee, the Constitution of Connecticut does not contain a provision
virtually identical to Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution. It does,
however, include a provision requiring the treasurer of the state to "receive
all moneys belonging to the state, and disburse the same only as he may be
1
86 See generally Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-132 (recognizing the limited scope
of Quertermous and Jones v. Commonwealth) (quoted supra in text accompanying
note 128).
1
87 See Tom Loftus, Court Hearing Held as State Operate[s] Without Budget;
Judge Will Hear Debate on Patton Spending Plan, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.),
July 2, 2002, at B 1 ("Unlike Kentucky, Tennessee's failure to pass a budget stems
from a lack of revenue. Tennessee's legislature needs to raise about $800 million
to keep state services at current levels, and the legislature has been unable to agree
on a plan to do that.").
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directed bylaw,""'8 and the Attorney General of Connecticut has construed
this provision to require "an authority from the legislature."
'1 89
In addition to this, however, the courts of Connecticut have also laid
down a precedent similar to Quertermous. In State v. Staub, a decision
handed down in 1892, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut was
asked to review a mandamus against the comptroller of the state. 9° The
mandamus had been issued to require the comptroller to disburse certain
funds to towns for educational purposes, as (apparently) required by
statute. 9' Complications had arisen because the legislature of the state had
"made no appropriation for said expenses or for any other expenses of the
state," and another statute prohibited the expenditure of funds without
appropriations by the legislature.192 Perceiving a conflict between
procedural and substantive rules, the court concluded that "[t]he paramount
must control. The command to provide for the essential operations of
government must prevail against a rule of procedure in applying the funds
raised by taxation for the support of the government."'93
The decision in Staub may be subject to criticism because the statute
that called upon the comptroller to distribute certain funds to towns may
itself have constituted an appropriation, thus providing an easy ground for
sustaining the mandamus.' 94 Indeed, the Staub court appeared to recognize
this, reasoning: "In the absence of a special appropriation the existence of
a law requiring an expenditure to be incurred is an appropriation of money
for that purpose, and the law imposes on the comptroller the duty of settling
and adjusting demands against the state for such expenses."' 95 Putting this
to the side, the continuing significance of Staub, recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, 96 is roughly analogous to that of
Quertermous. Indeed, in 1991 Attorney General Richard Blumenthal of
Connecticut recognized that, under Staub, "essential services of govern-
ment must continue and must continue to be paid for in the absence of a
"8 CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (emphasis added).
189 Conn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 91-019 (June 7, 1991), 1991 Conn. AG LEXIS
79, * 15 (quoting Shattuck v. Kincaid, 49 P. 758 (Ore. 1897), and other decisions).
190 See State v. Staub, 23 A. 924, 924-95 (1892).
'91 See id. at 925.
19 2 id.
'93 Id. at 927.
194 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of a
legislature's flexibility in making appropriations.
191 Staub, 23 A. at 926.
196 See Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 480 A.2d 476, 480 (1984).
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budget."'97 General Blumenthal went on, however, to advise against the
invocation of this precedent, owing to the complexity of its administration:
The Staub decision has not been applied in modem times in the absence
of an entire State budget. Practical problems would inevitably arise in
applying the Staub standard. The Staub standard itself suffers from a
significant lack of clarity, rendering the choice among spending options
difficult to make and support. The necessity to select expenses actually
allowable could cause uncertainty and confusion in the operation and
delivery of State services. Doubt and anxiety would be rampant not only
among State employees, but also among recipients of services and the
public in general. It would prevail even after the initial determination as
to which services and programs would continue to be funded in the
absence of a budget, since the initial decisions very likely would be
reviewed and possibly challenged in the courts.
In order to avoid these problems and others, we strongly advise that
a continuing resolution be passed by the General Assembly and signed by
the Governor prior to June 14, 1991.198
2. Implications for Kentucky
Attorney General Blumenthal's opinion is particularly apt for Kentucky
because of the decision in Staub, which corresponds somewhat to
Quertermous. As General Blumenthal indicated, however, Staub does not
apply to all expenses of government, but only those properly characterized
as essential. Consequently, his opinion does not provide support for the
spending plan adopted by the Governor of Kentucky in 2002. Of course,
General Blumenthal was undeniably correct in his observation that
identifying essential public services would be difficult, and his advice was
well-founded that the legislature of Connecticut should enact some kind of
continuing resolution appropriating funds on an interim basis. But this
should not be interpreted to suggest that such determinations could not
possibly be made, either by an executive implementing a properly
constructed spending plan or by a court exercising jurisdiction over a
challenge to a comprehensive plan.199
"' Conn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 91-019 (June 7, 1991), 1991 Conn. AG LEXIS
79, *11.
98Id. at *13.
'99 See infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of a court's
capacity to distinguish essential from non-essential public services.
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D. Summary
Learned opinion in the foregoing jurisdictions, all of which are subject
to rules analogous to Section 230, confirms that the spending plan adopted
by the Governor of Kentucky in 2002 did not comport with fundamental
rules of divided government.200 These opinions reflect a high degree of
formalism and attentiveness to the principles of separated power as laid
down in the applicable constitution, and none would support a spending
plan along the lines of that adopted by the Governor in 2002. Were another
Governor to adopt a similar plan, it would be properly vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.
V. THE QUESTION OF STANDING
As noted earlier, the Franklin Circuit Court never ruled on the validity
of the Governor's spending plan. Instead, it dismissed the action to confirm
the plan's constitutionality as moot in March 2003.01 Because the case
never proceeded to a final ruling, one cannot know with certainty that it
would have overcome procedural hurdles that, at least in theory, could have
prevented it from being decided on the merits. Among these is the
requirement that the parties seeking relief have standing to sue, discussed
in this part of the Article. In the next part, another of these hurdles is
discussed, the requirement that the case be justiciable. In point of fact, the
court never fully resolved either of these issues, although on one occasion
it did strongly indicate that one of the intervening parties, Senator
Williams, had standing to participate.20 2 This part of the Article concludes
200 Most likely, the office of every attorney general in the United States has
opined on some aspect of a gap in appropriations. In 1982, for example, Attorney
General Robert Abrams of New York was asked whether New York could lawfully
pay its employees in scrip, for which it would have only a moral obligation of
repayment, during a gap. See N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 82-Fl (1992), 1982 N.Y. AG
LEXIS 100, * 1. General Abrams indicated that it could. See id. at *2-3 ("[T]he
existing legal authority leads to the conclusion that the issuance of scrip would
probably be upheld by the courts. The question, however, is not free from doubt.").
Similarly, in 1981 Attorney General Wilson L. Condon of Alaska opined that
money could be disbursed from the state's treasury after the legislature had passed
a budget, but before the governor had signed it. See Alas. Op. Informal Att'y Gen.,
File No. J-66-866-81 (1981), 1981 Alas. AG LEXIS 492, *2-3. These opinions are
important, but I have not discussed them in the text because they do not compre-
hensively address the issues presented by a gap in appropriations.
201 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
202 Senator Williams was the only party whose standing was expressly called
into question.
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that at least someone would most likely have standing to test the validity of
an executive spending plan. Before the analysis in support of this conclu-
sion is set forth, however, this Article discusses analogous issues at the
federal level, where it appears by contrast that a more limited conception
of standing would most likely preclude an action to test the constitutionality
of an executive spending plan.
A. The United States
As noted earlier, the federal Appropriations Clause and the Anti-
Deficiency Act, as interpreted by the Attorney General of the United States,
would almost certainly preclude comprehensive disbursements from the
treasury in the absence of appropriations. The reader may be interested to
note, however, that actual enforcement of these provisions of law is quite
possibly limited to the prospect of civil or criminal actions under the Anti-
Deficiency Act. The Anti-Deficiency Act does not confer a private right of
action, and a direct action on the Appropriations Clause would most likely
be untenable.
As one can readily imagine, the individuals most obviously hurt by
disbursements from the treasury in the absence of appropriations are
members of the taxpaying public and members of the legislature, whose
prerogative is usurped. But both legislative and taxpayer standing are
difficult to maintain in the federal courts on a federal predicate.
1. Legislative Standing
In the case ofRaines v. Byrd, six members of Congress--four Senators
and two Representatives--brought suit against the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
seeking to overturn legislation that authorized the President to exercise a
line-item veto.20 3 They asserted an injury to their persons in their political
capacities by virtue of the fact that their votes on expenditures meant less
under the threat of such a veto.204 The Court rejected their claim, however,
reasoning that these members could not claim to have been "deprived of
something to which they personally [were] entitled-such as their seats as
members of Congress after their constituents had elected them., 205 The
Court was not willing to recognize standing on the basis of an injury that
arises from an altered playing field.
203 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814 (1997).
204 See id. at 816.
205Id. at 821.
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The Raines Court took pains to distinguish Coleman v. Miller, a case
in which just over half of Kansas's Senators brought suit to challenge that
state's purported ratification of an amendment to the federal
206Constitution. In Coleman, a resolution to ratify the proposed amendment
was laid before the Kansas Senate and received twenty votes in favor and
twenty opposed. The Lieutenant Governor of the state, the chamber's
presiding officer, then voted in favor of the resolution, and the House
followed suit, adopting the resolution. The twenty Senators who voted
against the resolution, joined by one who voted in its favor and three
Representatives, then sought mandamus to restrain various officials from
giving the state's assent to the proposed amendment. Although the Supreme
Court ruled against the legislators on the merits, it agreed that they had
standing to sue. Specifically, the Court reasoned that the legislators could
sue because they claimed to have been deprived of their opportunity to vote
on the ratification and because the measure could not have been enacted
without their collective votes.20 7 The collective votes of the plaintiffs in
Raines v. Byrd, by contrast, would not have been sufficient to prevent
Congress from enacting the legislation at issue in that case.
Taken together, Raines and Coleman indicate thatjudicial enforcement
of the federal Appropriations Clause at the instance of an action by
legislators, if possible at all, would require suit by enough legislators to
prevent enactment of an appropriation. This would be a majority of either
house of Congress--51 Senators or 218 Representatives. Without the votes
of this number of federal legislators, no appropriation could pass. Conse-
quently, a non-legislative disbursement from the treasury would arguably
deprive them of a prerogative assigned to them by the Constitution.
Needless to say, these are large numbers. Furthermore, the Raines Court
was careful to note that other considerations could preclude applying the
apparent rule of Coleman at the federal level.208
2 See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 436 (1939).
207 See id. at 43 8, 441, 446.
208 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 824. The Court went on to suggest other possible
grounds for distinguishing Raines from Coleman. See id. at 824 n.8.
There is another aspect of Raines that merits attention. After distinguishing
Coleman and engaging in a lengthy historical analysis, the Raines Court went on
to suggest that the President of the United States, who personifies the executive
branch of government, lacked standing to challenge an incursion on his prerogative
to remove high-ranking executive officials. The Court did not cite a case in this
portion of its opinion, however. See id. at 826-28; id. at 827 ("It occurred to neither
of these Presidents [Grant and Cleveland] that they might challenge the [Tenure of
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2. Taxpayer Standing
Taxpayer standing is similarly elusive in the federal system. In fact, it
is generally not allowed. In the famous case of Frothingham v. Mellon,29
a federal taxpayer brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury to
restrain him from disbursing money from the federal treasury under the
Maternity Act, which provided federal funds to reduce mortality among
mothers and infants to states willing to comply with its requirements.2 0
Frothingham argued that the Act intruded upon the reserved powers of the
states. The Court affirmed a non-suit against her on the ground that her
opposition to the act in question was political and that her injury from the
disbursements at issue was purely speculative and likely non-existent. 1
A number of years after Frothingham, the Supreme Court of the United
States did allow a limited form of taxpayer standing in the case of Flast v.
Cohen.2 12 In this case, federal taxpayers brought suit against the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare to restrain that official from disbursing
certain funds from the federal treasury under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965.213 In particular, these individuals opposed dis-
bursement of funds for the benefit of children in private, sectarian schools,
arguing that such disbursements would constitute an establishment of
religion.214 The lower court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing on the
authority of Frothingham,215 but the Supreme Court reversed, setting forth
a variant test for standing that the plaintiffs in this case satisfied. Under this
test, a plaintiff has standing to challenge a federal action if there is a nexus
between the plaintiff's status and the type of federal action at issue, and if
there is also a nexus between the type of federal action at issue and the
particular provision of federal law that the plaintiff argues the action
violates.216 The plaintiffs in this case were said to satisfy this "double
nexus" test because of the nexus between their status as taxpayers and the
Office] Act in an Article III Court."). This analysis can thus readily be described
as dictum.
209 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
210 Id. at 479.
211 See id. at 487-88.
212 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
"' Id. at 85.
2 14 Id. at 86.
2 5 Id. at 88.
216 See id. at 102-03.
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type of federal action at issue-an expenditure from the federal trea-
sury-and because of the nexus between the federal government's power
to spend money and the clause of the First Amendment prohibiting an
establishment of religion. 27 The Court reasoned that one of the specific
evils the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent was the expenditure
of public money for sectarian purposes.218
But the exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing
recognized in Flast v. Cohen is not broad and, in fact, has not been satisfied
in any context other than a challenge by a federal taxpayer to a federal
expenditure alleged to constitute an establishment of religion. Thus, in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., the Court rejected a challenge to the administrative
transfer of surplus federal property to a sectarian educational institution on
the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.2 9 The Court distinguished
Flast on two grounds. First, an executive agency, not Congress, had
effected the transfer.220 Second, authority for the transfer did not rest on the
federal government's power to tax and spend but instead rested on the
Property Clause.22' Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War,222 the Court turned back a challenge to service by members
of Congress in the Armed Forces Reserve, reasoning that the Committee
had not challenged an exercise of the legislature's spending power but
instead had simply challenged the executive's practice of allowing
members of Congress to maintain their status in the reserve.223
Most importantly, for purposes of this Article, the double nexus test of
Flast failed to suffice in United States v. Richardson, a case involving the
duty of the federal government to report moneys expended by the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA").224 Richardson argued that the Constitution
required publication of the CIA's expenditures.225 This has great signifi-
cance for the issues presented in this Article because the Statement and
Account Clause, which was at issue in Richardson, is located in the same
217 See id. at 103-04.21 Id. at 103.
219 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489-90 (1982).
220 See id. at 479.
221 See id. at 480.
222 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
223 Id. at 228.
224 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167-69 (1974).
22 51d. at 167.
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clause of the Federal Constitution as the Appropriations Clause, which
forbids non-legislative disbursements from the treasury.26 The Court held
that Richardson lacked standing and distinguished Flast on the ground that
Richardson was not complaining about the CIA's expenditures per se; he
was complaining about his inability to know what it was doing.227
The fact that a federal taxpayer lacked standing to invoke the Statement
and Account Clause suggests, but certainly does not dictate, that such a
taxpayer might also lack standing to invoke the Appropriations Clause.
This, combined with the high, if not insuperable, hurdle for legislative
standing in the federal system, indicates that a direct action on the
Appropriations Clause would be problematic. As a consequence, the federal
polity must rely principally upon the willingness of the executive branch to
adhere strictly to the terms of the Appropriations Clause and the Anti-
Deficiency Act. Fortunately for the scheme of separated power, the
executive tends to do this.228 In addition, as we have seen, Congress has not
been a silent partner in the process. Instead, it has enacted legislation as
recently as 1990 to confirm that it expects the Anti-Deficiency Act to be
interpreted with a fair degree of strictness. As the following sub-part will
demonstrate, plaintiffs seeking to challenge an executive spending plan will
most likely find the courts of Kentucky more accessible than their federal
counterparts.
B. Kentucky
The basic rule for standing in Kentucky is that, in order to bring suit,
a person must have a "judicially recognizable interest in the subject matter
of the suit. ' 229 This language has the potential for being broad, but it is
226 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. This clause provides in full:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time."
Id.
227 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175-77.
228 Indeed, the Anti-Deficiency Act provides for civil and criminal enforcement,
and the Department of Justice has notified federal officials that it will seek
indictments for violations of the act in appropriate situations. See 4 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 16, 20 (Apr. 25, 1980) ("[T]he Department of Justice will take actions to
enforce the criminal provisions of the Act in appropriate cases in the future when
violations of the Antideficiency Act are alleged.").
229 Ashland v. Ashland FOP No. 3, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1994).
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written in such vague terms that it does not provide much guidance in
isolation. This sub-part will consider the prospects for standing by members
of the legislature and by taxpayers to challenge non-legislative disburse-
ments from the treasury.
1. Legislative Standing
The courts of Kentucky seem to take a broader view of when a public
official can go to court to defend the prerogatives of office than did the
Supreme Court of the United States in Raines v. Byrd. In Legislative
Research Commission v. Brown,23 for example, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky addressed a challenge to certain enactments that arguably altered
the separation of power between the legislative and executive branches of
government. The case had begun as a declaratory action by the Legislative
Research Commission to validate its authority under certain parts of the
legislation, and the original defendants, the Governor and Attorney General
of Kentucky, had by counterclaim called in question other parts."' The
legislation in question, it was argued, enlarged the authority of the General
Assembly to act through its agent the Legislative Research Commission,
particularly when the General Assembly was not in session, and the court
quite clearly recognized that these enlargements would largely come at the
expense of the executive branch.232
The Kentucky Supreme Court went on to strike down many provisions
of the legislation at issue. It must be noted, however, that neither the
Governor nor the Attorney General, who in filing a counterclaim took on
the functional status of plaintiffs, alleged that the legislation interfered with
his activities in a particular or concrete way, such as by preventing him
from receiving a paycheck, or taking office, as the Raines v. Byrd Court's
230 Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
231 Id. at 909.
232 See id. at 911-14. The court held:
The adoption of administrative regulations necessary to implement and
carry out the purpose of legislative enactments is executive in nature and is
ordinarily within the constitutional purview of the executive branch of
government. We conclude that [the statutory provisions at issue, which
provide for] legislative or [Legislative Research Comnimission] review of
proposed regulations as those statutes are presently written are violative of
Ky. Const. Secs. 27-28 and are a legislative encroachment into the power
of the executive branch.
Id. at 919 (citation omitted).
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dictum would seem to require. Nevertheless, the issue of representative
standing was not addressed in the Legislative Research Commission court's
opinion.233
There is another interesting possibility that remains to be fully
explored. Because of the unique status of the presiding officers of the two
chambers of the General Assembly, either of those individuals may have an
enhanced capacity to maintain suit to prevent non-legislative disbursements
from the treasury. Section 56 of the Kentucky Constitution calls for a
dramatic series of events by the presiding officer of each chamber before
any bill, including a bill appropriating money, can become law. This
suggests that the presiding officer's duties are indispensable to the
enactment of legislation. In pertinent part, this section provides:
No bill shall become a law until the same shall have been signed by
the presiding officer of each of the two Houses in open session; and
before such officer shall have affixed his signature to any bill, he shall
suspend all other business, declare that such bill will now be read, and
that he will sign the same to the end that it may become law. The bill shall
then be read at length and compared; and, if correctly enrolled, he shall,
in the presence of the House in open session, and before any other
business is entertained, affix his signature, which in fact shall be noted in
the journal, and the bill immediately sent to the other House.
234
Read in conjunction with Section 230, which forbids non-legislative
disbursements from the treasury, Section 56 supports the argument that, if
funds were disbursed from the treasury without appropriations, the power
of the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House to sign legisla-
tion that could properly appropriate funds would be usurped. This would
support the argument that the officer at issue is asserting a personal interest
or seeking to vindicate a power uniquely associated with his or her office
that has been usurped.235
233 In addition, in Patton v. Sherman, No. 01-CI-00660, slip op. at 2 (Franklin
Cir. Ct. (Ky.) Jan. 11,2002), the court reasoned that "the Governor has a judicially
recognizable interest in the Executive Branch's ability and duty to faithfully
execute the law," id., strongly suggesting that a mere threat to the ability of a public
official to carry out the duties of office suffices to establish standing to sue.
234 Ky. CONST. § 56.
235 It is also possible that the elected leader of a chamber would have enhanced
authority to bring suit on behalf of the membership. See id. § 34 (providing for the
choosing of the Speaker of the House); id. § 85 (providing for the choosing of the
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In fact, the above-quoted language from Section 56 played an important
role in a case decided long ago by the highest court in Kentucky styled
Kavanaugh v. Chandler.2 36 In this case, the Lieutenant Governor, who
served as presiding officer of the Senate at that time, refused to sign several
pieces of engrossed legislation on the ground that they improperly had been
given their first reading in the Senate on the same day they had passed the
House.2 37 As the court explained in the opening paragraph of its decision,
the issue presented therein was "whether or not the signature of the
presiding officer of the Senate is essential to the enactment of a legislative
bill into law., 238 Answering in the affirmative, the court concluded that,
because the bills in question "did not have the requisite impress of
legislative sanction," they were "wanting in the constitutional essentials of
due enactment" and "[did] not have the force of law." '239 The court did
reason, however, that mandamus could lie to compel the presiding officer
of the Senate to sign properly engrossed legislation. The problem in that
case, however, was that the legislature in question had adjourned.24 °
In fact, the Kavanaugh v. Chandler issue had come up in another,
earlier case, Hamlett v. McCreary, in which the presiding officer of the
Senate had failed to sign an engrossed bill out of inadvertence instead of
design.241 In this case as well the court held that the legislation in question
was not valid. Referring to Section 56, the court noted that:
This language is express, sweeping, and mandatory. It provides, in
express terms, that no bill shall become law until the same shall have been
signed by the presiding officer of each of the two houses in open session,
and after certain specified and formal prerequisites have been complied
with.
24 2
President of the Senate).
236 Kavanaugh v. Chandler, 72 S.W.2d 1003 (Ky. 1934).
237 See id. at 1004.
238 Id. at 1003.
23 91d. at 1006.
240 See id. at 1005-06.
241 See Hamlett v. McCreary, 156 S.W. 410 (Ky. 1913), overruled in part by
D&W Auto Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. 1980).
242 Id. at 411. The court also held:
We have been referred to no case which upholds the validity of an act of the
Legislature which bears the approving signature of the presiding officer of
one house only; and certainly, under the strong language of section 56 of
our Constitution, no such bill can be permitted to become a law.
Id. at 413.
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Given the language of Section 56 and of the cases that have applied it,
this provision of the constitution puts the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House not only in the position of persons with a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation but also in a position similar to that
of the Senators who brought suit in Coleman v. Miller.243 This is because
the presiding officer of either of the chambers alone is competent to
forestall any disbursement by refusing to affix his or her signature to the
bill in question. In other words, because of Section 56, either of these
presiding officers can claim to have been "deprived of something to which
[he or she] personally is entitled." 2" Specifically, a presiding officer can
claim he or she was deprived of the right to sign legislation that appropri-
ates funds.
Another case possibly in this vein is Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Inc.245 In Rose, the state's highest court was called upon to
decide whether a collection of school boards had standing to sue certain
officers of the government to cause them to consider legislation to improve
the educational system in Kentucky.246 The court began its analysis by
stating the familiar rules that, "[i]n order to have standing to sue, a plaintiff
need only have a real and substantial interest in the subject matter of the
litigation, as opposed to a mere expectancy," '247 and that "in order to have
standing in a lawsuit a party must have a judicially recognizable interest in
the subject matter of the suit. 248 The Rose court then went on to reason that
the school boards had standing because they "were statutorily obligated to
promote public education for their respective constituents," and because it
was their duty "to make every effort to remedy [the] situation" if the school
system was not "efficient," as required by Section 183 of the
constitution.249 It seems plausible to argue on this basis that the presiding
officers of the two chambers of the legislature each have standing to
challenge non-legislative disbursements from the treasury because they
each have a duty to ensure that actions that require statutory authorization
bearing their signatures in fact do so.
243 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
244 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
245 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
246 Id. at 193.
247 Id. at 202.
248 Id. (quoting HealthAmerica Corp. of Ky. v. Humana Health Plan of Ky., 697
S.W.2d 946, 947 (Ky. 1985)).
249 Id. at 202.
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The upshot of the foregoing is that legislative standing to challenge an
executive spending plan would most likely exist in Kentucky, and this was
the indication of the Franklin Circuit Court in the recent litigation over the
Governor's spending plan.
2. Taxpayer Standing
Kentucky's test for taxpayer standing is quite lenient, and, unlike the
federal system, most likely would permit a challenge against non-legislative
disbursements from the treasury. An important case in this regard is Price
v. Commonwealth, a decision by the Court of Appeals that involved
taxpayer standing to challenge an expenditure relating to non-public
schooling.25° In this decision the Court of Appeals set forth strong language
that distinguished Kentucky's law of taxpayer standing from its federal
counterpart"' and emphasized the breadth of taxpayer standing in the
Commonwealth.252 In fact, the Price court cited several cases that suggest
Kentucky's rules for standing are generally broad. 3
3. Citizen Standing, or Standing by Necessity
There is also the prospect in Kentucky of citizen standing, or of
"standing by necessity"--that any citizen of the Commonwealth--official,
taxpayer, both, or neither-should be deemed to have standing to challenge
non-legislative disbursements from the treasury because someone must
have standing to do so, and the plaintiff before the court may be as good as
anybody else. This reasoning was just below the surface in the case of Gay
v. Haggard, a mandamus to compel a county road supervisor to let
contracts by competitive bidding, as required by statute.254 The highest
court of Kentucky recognized the plaintiffs status as a taxpayer, but it
suggested a much broader conception of standing in the following
language:
250 See Price v. Commonwealth, 945 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
25 See id. at 431 n.2 and accompanying text.
252 See id. at 431 ("From the more recent case of Gillis v. Yount, Ky., 748
S.W.2d 357 (1988), to cases from the last century, Kentucky has consistently
recognized taxpayer standing to challenge the constitutionality of city, county and
state taxes and expenditures.").
253 See id. at 431-32 (discussing State Text-Book Comm'n v. Weathers, 213
S.W. 207 (Ky. 1919), which recognized a party's standing to sue as "a citizen and
patron of [the Commonwealth's] common schools," and other cases).
254 Gay v. Haggard, 118 S.W. 299, 303-04 (Ky. 1909).
[VOL. 92
EXECUTIVE SPENDING PLAN
The right of a single taxpayer to maintain such an action is no longer in
doubt. It would seem to follow that where a ministerial act was required
by law to be done, which if done would inure to the benefit of the public,
the tardy official might be set in motion and compelled to act by a suit by
one of the public affected, suing on his own behalf and on behalf of
others. Nor is it necessary that the plaintiff should show a special interest
to be affected by the act. The reason it is public is because all the public
are equally affected by it at least theoretically; and, ifno one of thepublic
could maintain the suit, none less than all could, which would be
practically a denial of the right to sue, for it is scarcely possible that all
citizens of a county or other territory could be got to act together in any
matter.
2 55
Finally, it should be noted that courts often treat standing as a
pragmatic concept, not one driven by bright lines. Flast v. Cohen, as noted
earlier, involved standing at the federal level.256 In this case, certain
taxpayers brought suit to challenge certain federal expenditures as
constituting an establishment of religion.257 The government argued that
they lacked standing to sue because they lacked the requisite stake in the
litigation.2 8 The Court rejected this argument, however, and held that the
plaintiffs had standing.259 In the course of doing so, the Court recognized
that standing is a fairly amorphous concept driven by a variety ofjurispru-
dential considerations, noting
[s]tanding is an aspect of justiciability and, as such, the problem of
standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere
in justiciability. Standing has been called one of the most amorphous
[concepts] in the entire domain of public law.... In addition, there are at
work in the standing doctrine the many subtle pressures which tend to
cause policy considerations to blend into constitutional limitations
2 60
The Court went on to note that the constitutional limitations on standing are
actually quite modest.26 1 It held that, "in terms of Article Ill limitations on
255 Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
256 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
257 d. at 85.
2581 d. at 88.
259 1d. at 103.
2 60 Id. at 99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
261 Id. at 101.
2003-2004]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to
whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution." '262 Whether this approach to standing is advisable is beyond the
scope of this Article. For purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that
this approach exists.
VI. THE QUESTION OF JUSTICIABILITY
Another possible impediment to judicial review of an executive
spending plan involves the justiciability of a challenge to such a plan.
Justiciability, the susceptibility of a dispute to judicial resolution, has many
dimensions, two of which present themselves for consideration here. The
first concerns whether the positions of the parties to the dispute are
sufficiently adverse to merit the attention of the judiciary and to give the
issues at hand their fullest elaboration. The second concerns whether a
court would be capable of making the kinds of decisions required to bring
a spending plan within the scope of Section 230. Depending on who sued
whom, and for what kind of relief, these issues may not arise.
A. Absence of a Legally Adverse Relationship
If someone supporting the constitutionality of an executive spending
plan sued another party who also supported such a plan, the danger of a
collusive suit would arise; that is, a suit in which the parties' positions were
not actually adverse. Courts prefer not to exercise jurisdiction over these
kinds of cases because they do not present real controversies, and because
courts cannot generally rely upon parties who fundamentally agree with
each other to delineate issues fully for the court's consideration. An
illustrative case in this regard is United States v. Johnson.263 In this case, a
tenant who lived in a rent-controlled dwelling brought suit against his
landlord, arguing that the latter was charging him rent in excess of the
amount permitted by law. The landlord answered that the statute was
unconstitutional because it improperly delegated legislative power to an
administrative official, and the lower court agreed, dismissing the
complaint. 2' The United States then moved the court to reopen and dismiss
the case on the ground that the suit had been "collusive and did not involve
262 Id.
263 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (per curiam).
264 See id. at 302-03.
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a real case or controversy." '265 The district court refused, but the Supreme
Court was receptive to this argument on appeal.266 Noting that the landlord
had dominated both sides of the litigation,267 the Court vacated the
judgment below with instructions to dismiss. 268 As the Court reasoned, an
"'honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated" is
"essential to the integrity of the judicial process" and "indispensable to
adjudication of constitutional questions. 269
If a party who supported the constitutionality of an executive spending
plan brought suit against another party taking essentially the same position,
the teaching of United States v. Johnson might apply. Indeed, the recent
litigation over the Governor's spending plan may have implicated that
teaching. In this case, the Treasurer brought suit against the Secretary of the
Finance and Administration Cabinet, asking the court to affirm the
constitutionality of the plan in all respects.270 Although the Secretary did
not confess judgment, in his answer he tended more to agree with the
Treasurer than to disagree with him, asking the court to validate the
spending plan in its entirety, subject only to the requirement that it not be
arbitrary and capricious. 2' Later, in his tendered Judgment, the Secretary
asked the court to grant both its motion for summary judgment and that of
the Treasurer.272 Given the significant congruence between the positions
265 Id. at 303.
266 See id. at 305.
267 See id. at 303-04.
268 See id. at 305.
269 Id. (citations for internal quotations omitted).
270 See Complaint for Declaratory Relief para. 3, at 8, Spending Plan Litigation,
supra note 28.
271 See Response of the Finance and Administration Cabinet to the Motions for
Summary Judgment on Behalf of David L. Williams and Kentucky Retirement
Systems and Memorandum in Support of the Cabinet's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 30-31, Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28. See infra note 285 for
a discussion of the applicability of this standard to the spending plan.
272 Judgment tendered with Response of the Finance and Administration
Cabinet to the Motions for Summary Judgment on Behalf of David L. Williams and
Kentucky Retirement Systems and Memorandum in Support of the Cabinet's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Spending Plan Litigation, supra note 28. It
was reported that the two sides conferred over the suit before filing. See Tom
Loftus, Patton Asserts Power Over State Spending; Treasurer Seeks Court's OK
for Governor's Budget Plan, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 27, 2002, at B 1
("[Governor] Patton also said that, after consultation with administration officials
and the attorney general's office, state Treasurer Jonathan Miller would file a
lawsuit asking Franklin Circuit Court to declare his plan permissible and neces-
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taken by these two officers, a court confronting the same situation in the
future could quite plausibly choose to dismiss the matter for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, owing to the absence of a sufficiently adverse
relationship between the parties. Of course, the Treasurer and Secretary
were not the only parties to the litigation, but they were the original
parties.
273
B. Absence of Judicially Manageable Standards
A second possible ground upon which a court could deem a challenge
to an executive spending plan non-justiciable would be that administering
a judgment against the executive would be an unmanageable task for the
judiciary.274 Without doubt, a challenge to comprehensive executive
spending plan, calling for strict adherence to Section 230, as interpreted by
such cases as Quertermous and Jones, would require a significant amount
of judicial attention. In particular, a court could well be called upon to
decide what kinds of public services qualify as "specific and essential" and
therefore merit a disbursement from the treasury in the absence of
appropriations. This would undoubtedly be a difficult task,275 but it would
not be insuperable. Similar and even identical projects have been under-
taken by the courts in the past. In Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc. ,276 for example, courts undertook to evaluate exactly how Kentucky
paid for its system of common schools, examining a volume of evidence
that the Supreme Court described as a "tidal wave. 277 More to the point of
this Article, in First National Bank ofManchester v. Hays the circuit court
relied upon a commissioner to examine claims of indebtedness against a
sary.").
273 One may note with interest that in Miller v. Quertermous the Treasurer and
the Secretary's predecessor, the Commissioner of Finance, were on the same side
of the litigation, each having been named as defendants in an action by the
Commissioner of Welfare to compel the disbursement of certain funds from the
treasury. See Miller v. Quertermous, 202 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. 1947).
"'4 See generally Philpot v. Haviland, 880 S.W.2d 550,553 (Ky. 1994) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting that a court may deem an action
non-justiciable for lack of "judicially discoverable and manageable standard[s] for
resolving" the case)).
275 See Conn. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 91-019 (June 7, 1991), 1991 Conn. AG
LEXIS 79, * 13 (describing the complexity of separating essential from non-
essential public services).
276 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
277 Id. at 197.
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county and to separate claims pertaining to "indispensable governmental
charges," which were deemed "fundable," from other claims.278 Given the
complexity of the evidence evaluated in Rose, the nature of the decisions
rendered in First National Bank of Manchester, and the ample guidance
provided by such authority as Quertermous, Jones, and the Civiletti
Opinion, "judicially discoverable and manageable standard[s]" for
adjudicating a challenge to an executive spending plan exist.279
In addition, adjudicating such a challenge would simply involve the
courts in doing what courts are uniquely suited to do--interpreting a
provision of the constitution and the cases and other authority pertaining
thereto. Indeed, determining the extent to which Section 230 will permit
non-legislative disbursements from the treasury is strictly a matter of
law-just as interpreting Section 183 of the constitution, which requires the
legislature to "provide for an efficient system of common schools
throughout the state, 28° was a pure legal issue in Rose.28' In this case, the
appellants argued that the judiciary should not "substitute its judgment for
the judgment of the General Assembly, ''282 as to whether the state's system
of common schools was constitutionally efficient. The court rejected this
argument, stating:
The ultimate issue [before us] is whether the system of common schools
in the Commonwealth established by the General Assembly... is in
compliance with the constitution. Specifically, we are asked-based
solely on the evidence in the record before us-if the present system...
is "efficient" in the constitutional sense. It is our sworn duty, to decide
such questions when they are before us by applying the constitution. The
duty of the judiciary in Kentucky was so determined when the citizens of
Kentucky enacted the social compact called the Constitution and in it
provided for the existence of a third equal branch of government, the
judiciary.
283
The court went on to note:
278 First Nat'l Bank of Manchester v. Hays, 156 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Ky. 1941).
279 Philpot, 880 S.W.2d at 553 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)). In any case, a court could pursue the appointment of a commissioner. See
K.R.S. ch. 3 1A.040 (Michie 1998).
280 Ky. CONST. § 183.
281 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196 n.11.
282 Id. at 208.
283 Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
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The issue before us--the constitutionality of the system of statutes
that created the common schools-is the only issue. To avoid deciding the
case because of "legislative discretion," "legislative function," etc., would
be a denigration of our own constitutional duty. To allow the General
Assembly (or, in point offact, the Executive) to decide whether its actions
are constitutional is literally unthinkable.
284
Given Rose, it is at least arguably "unthinkable" that a court would refuse
to adjudicate a challenge to an executive spending plan on the simple
ground of difficulty-or a request for deference from the executive branch.
No matter where the constitution draws the line between the legislature and
the executive or between the executive and the judiciary, the responsibility
to identify that line lies exclusively with the courts, at least with regard to
cases that come before them. As the highest court of Kentucky went on to
note in Rose:
The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret,
define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and sections of the
Kentucky Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it. It is
solely the function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be exercised
even when such action serves as a check on the activities of another
branch of government.
285
284 Id. (emphasis added).
28 Id. See also Commonwealth Revenue Cabinet ex. rel. Gillis v. Graham, 710
S.W.2d 227, 229 (1986); Exparte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617,622 (1978) ("The final
authority to say what the law is must reside somewhere in any governmental
structure. In our systems, state and federal, it resides in the judicial department.").
See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,613 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the lack of
power to act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly moving authority. No
doubt a government with distributed authority, subject to be challenged in
the courts of law, at least long enough to consider and adjudicate the
challenge, labors under restrictions from which other governments are free.
It has not been our tradition to envy such governments.
Id.
In his motion for summary judgment, the Secretary also argued that the Court
should review the spending plan only for abuse of discretion. See Response of the
Finance and Administration Cabinet to the Motions for Summary Judgment on
Behalf of David L. Williams and Kentucky Retirement Systems and Memorandum
in Support of the Cabinet's Motion for Summary Judgment at 18-20, Spending
Plan Litigation, supra note 28. This argument substantially misapprehended the
nature of the issues presented in the case. The litigation over the constitutionality
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VII. OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Governor's spending plan for the fiscal year commencing July 1,
2002, did not comport with the Kentucky Constitution. Although adopted
for understandable reasons, the plan lacked a constitutional basis, and the
Governor should have limited non-legislative disbursements to specific and
essential government services. Indeed, the prospect of another executive
spending plan would pose a fundamental threat to separation of pow-
ers-particularly to the requirement that the General Assembly act only in
a bicameral manner.
In Kentucky, the General Assembly can override a gubernatorial veto
by a simple majority vote.286 Given the relative ease with which the
legislature can override a veto, the prospect of another executive spending
plan does not really pose a threat to the General Assembly's power as a
whole to control spending. In other words, if the Governor does not
approve of the legislature's budget but the legislature as a whole is united,
its version of the budget will most likely become law. Key to this scenario,
however, is the General Assembly's willingness and ability to present a
united front. With an executive spending plan available as an option, a
Governor can exploit disagreement between the chambers when such
disagreement is fundamental in nature.
The following hypothetical situation may suffice to illustrate this point.
Suppose, as is occasionally the case, that each house of the legislature is
dominated by a different political party. Given the nature of politics in
Kentucky, the Governor is likely to be a member either of the party that
dominates the Senate or of the party that dominates the House. If the
Governor could adopt a comprehensive, non-legislative spending plan, the
ability of the chamber not in political sympathy with the executive to
advocate in favor of its version of a budget would be seriously compro-
mised. The two houses could stick to their respective versions of the
budget; the legislature would adjourn; and the Governor could adopt as an
executive spending plan the version of the budget most in keeping with his
or her conception of the best public policy. In many respects, we would
have a unicameral legislature.2"7
of the Governor's spending plan was not a case about determinations of fact by an
administrative agency, but instead about the meaning of Section 230 of the
Constitution-an issue of pure law.
286 See Ky. CONST. § 88.
27 In the situation presented by the Governor's recent spending plan, for
example, the Governor chose the House's version of the budget as the starting
point in formulating his spending plan. See PATTON & RAMSEY, supra note 112,
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But Kentucky has a bicameral legislature, 288 and that structure was
specifically chosen to enhance separation of powers. As the highest court
of Kentucky noted in Legislative Research Commission v. Brown:
Here then is the fundamental constitution of the government we are
treating of. The legislative body being composed of two parts, they check
one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained
by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative.289
The requirement of bicameralism ensures that neither house of the
legislature is able to enact its wishes into law without the consent of the
other. In other words, although no one chamber can make legislation, it can
prevent legislation by refusing to concur. This power was recognized by the
framers of the federal Constitution as essential to a government of
separated powers.29 °
at 3 ("The goals for [the] fiscal year 2003 Spending Plan are to... mirror, to the
maximum degree possible, the financial provisions provided for in House Bill 1 as
introduced during the Special Session and as adopted by the House of Representa-
tives.").
288 See KY. CONST. § 46 ("No bill shall become a law unless, on its final
passage, it receives the votes of at least two-fifths of the members elected to each
House, and a majority of the members voting."); id. § 56 ("No bill shall become a
law until the same shall have been signed by the presiding officer of each of the
two Houses in open session." (emphasis added)).
289 Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Ky. 1984)
(quoting 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 159 (1823)
(emphasis added)).29o See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983) ("The bicameral requirement
... was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto and
indeed the two concepts are interdependent."); id. at 951 ("The division of the
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings.").
One unavoidable result of separation of powers is that law-making requires
public officials, who often have diametrically opposed views on policy, to reach
consensus. Allowing any participant in this process to implement his or her will
without the consent of the others deprives the citizenry of the very protection
separation of powers is meant to provide. Often the result of this process will be
ugly and aesthetically satisfying to no one, but not so repugnant to any one
participant that such an individual would refuse to concur. For an interesting
description of the process by which public officials reached consensus on a budget
for California in July 2003, see Evan Halper & Peter Nicholas, Both Sides Needed
a Budget Deal; Neither Burton nor Brulte Surrendered. But They Came to Realize
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The Commonwealth appears to have at least three options for handling
another gap in funding, in addition to the option of simply waiting for the
case to be litigated once again. One is the option of enacting legislation that
would provide for omnibus automatic interim funding in the event of
impasse over the budget. A second is the option of enacting legislation that
would provide for automatic interim funding only of essential services in
the event of impasse. A third is adoption by the executive of policies that
would implement Kentucky Constitution Section 230 and K.R.S. section
41.110 in the event of impasse. For the reasons set forth herein, I recom-
mend either the second or third of these options.
A. Legislative Options
1. Omnibus Automatic Interim Appropriations
The General Assembly could prevent gaps in appropriations simply by
enacting legislation that provides for continuing, comprehensive interim
appropriations if the Commonwealth enters a new fiscal year without a
budget. Such legislation could, for example, fund activities at the lower of
the rates last proposed by the House and the Senate, or could fund activities
on a straight-line basis from the previous fiscal biennium. These are options
to which a number of states,291 but not Congress, 292 have turned. The
They Had to End the Impasse, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2003, Cal. Metro, Pt. 2, at 1:
What finally broke the stalemate and triggered last week's announcement
of a budget deal was not so much a breakthrough, not an instance in which
one side surrendered. It grew out of a mutual realization that the gridlock
simply couldn't continue---that with schools and vendors panicked about
losing state money, and with the Legislature's poll numbers plummeting,
they needed to make a deal.
Id. For a description of a somewhat similar series of events in Nevada, see Sean
Whaley, BudgetImpasse: Lawmakers Talk of 'Last Day', LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July
21, 2003, at Al ("A supermajority for a tax bill is not necessary, according to a
controversial state Supreme Court ruling. But lawmakers want the two-thirds vote
to give any tax plan they send to the governor a stamp of legitimacy and to avoid
further legal challenges.").
291 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Fiscal Affairs-Legislative
Budget Procedures: Enactment of the Budget-Provisions and Procedures to
Finance Agency Operations If the Appropriations Act Is not Passed by the
Beginning of the Fiscal Year, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/lbptabls/
lbpc6t4.htm (posted June 27, 2003).
292 When appropriations expire at the federal level, Congress will often enact
continuing resolutions that provide funding on an interim basis. Although these
resolutions provide funding during a gap in appropriations, they are not permanent
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advantage of this kind of legislation is that it would reduce, or even
eliminate, the dislocation and anxiety that might arise from a gap in
appropriations and give legislators an opportunity (assuming the Governor
calls them back into session) to deliberate further before agreeing on a
comprehensive budget.
But this kind of legislation has at least one serious flaw, in that it would
give whoever prefers the result of the interim spending mechanism an upper
hand in the legislative process. For example, if the General Assembly
provided for automatic interim funding that simply extended existing
funding on a straight-line basis, those who favored the status quo would
have reduced incentive to compromise. Similarly, if the General Assembly
provided for automatic interim funding that adopted the lower of the two
houses' figures for any given line, legislators interested in cutting spending
would have an incentive to lowball undesired line-items and then to refuse
to budge. Finally, if the General Assembly provided for automatic interim
funding that adopted the average of the two houses' figures for any given
line, legislators would have reduced incentive to compromise during the
session, knowing that interim spending would take into account their last
position. The bottom line is simple: whoever's funding preference is
implemented in the absence of a timely, enacted budget has an obvious
advantage in the event of impasse and will lack full incentive to compro-
mise.
Further complicating the analysis here is the fact that the General
Assembly meets much less often than its federal counterpart-which also,
by the way, has no legislation in place providing for automatic interim
funding in the event of impasse. Whereas Congress adjourns largely at its
own discretion,293 the General Assembly meets for limited periods of time,
and never after July 1, the commencement of the state's fiscal period,
without a call from the Governor for a special session.294 Because of this,
pieces of legislation; they are enacted on an ad-hoc basis.
293 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 ("Neither House, during the Session of
Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.").294 See KY. CONST. § 36(1) ("The General Assembly, in odd-numbered years,
shall meet in regular session for a period not to exceed a total of thirty (30)
legislative days."); id. § 42 ("[N]or shall a session occurring in odd-numbered years
extend beyond March 30; nor shall a session of the General Assembly occurring
in even-numbered years continue beyond sixty legislative days, nor shall it extend
beyond April 15."); id. ("A legislative day shall be construed to mean a calendar
day."); id. § 80 (The Governor "may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the
General Assembly at the seat of government .... When he shall convene the
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if the General Assembly enacted legislation providing for automatic interim
funding in the case of budgetary impasse, discretion would lie entirely in
the hands of the Governor whether to call the legislature back into session
to resolve the impasse and bring interim spending to a close. If the interim
spending were disagreeable to the Governor, of course, he or she would
have incentive to call the legislature back into session.
2. Automatic Interim Appropriations Solely for Essential Services
A second option for the General Assembly would be to enact legisla-
tion authorizing disbursements from the treasury in the event of a budgetary
impasse solely for essential services. This kind of legislation would have
several advantages. First, like omnibus automatic interim appropriations,
this kind of legislation would tend to reduce the anxiety that might arise
from a gap in appropriations and give legislators some breathing room
(assuming the Governor called them back into session) to deliberate before
agreeing on a comprehensive budget. Second, this kind of legislation would
arguably provide less incentive to lawmakers to manipulate the system to
achieve a desired result. It stands to reason that few lawmakers would avoid
the give-and-take of the legislative process if funding only for essential
services were waiting in the wings. The manipulation referred to earlier
would only occur if somebody's preferred budget would become law in
the event of impasse. Presumably, no legislator would prefer a budget
limited to essential public services. Finally, legislation authorizing
automatic interim appropriations solely for essential services in the event
of impasse would affirm that the power of the purse lies in the General
Assembly.
On the negative side, legislation appropriating funds solely for essential
services would not completely preclude the dislocation and anxiety that
may arise from gaps in funding. In addition, the prospect of automatic
interim appropriations for essential services in the event of impasse would
reduce an important source of pressure upon the legislature to formulate a
budget. In this regard, it may be recalled that Tennessee's "Essential
Government Services Act of 2002" was set to expire after only five days.
On the other hand, Quertermous already provides a rough analog to this act,
and codifying Quertermous would arguably give the General Assembly an
added measure of control over appropriations.
General Assembly it shall be by proclamation, stating the subjects to be considered,
and no others shall be considered.").
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B. An Executive Option-Adoption of "Phase-Down " Policies
A third option would be for the executive branch to adopt policies that
conform to Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution and K.R.S. section
41.110. Although such policies would not prevent all of the dislocation and
anxiety that could arise from a gap in funding, they would preserve
separation of powers and provide a continuing incentive to the political
branches of government to compromise their differences and enact a
budget. This option would play out as follows:
Upon a request from the Governor, the Attorney General would issue
a formal opinion affirming that the power of the purse lies in the General
Assembly, and recognizing the exception to this general rule set forth in
Quertermous as limited by Ferguson v. Oates.295 The Secretary of Finance
and Administration would then formally adopt a policy implementing this
opinion, providing specific guidelines for heads of executive units to
follow. Third, the Secretary would require the heads of units in the
executive branch to submit for approval "phase-down plans" in the event
of a gap in funding. These plans would identify with specificity those
services provided by each unit that could properly be deemed "essential"
within the meaning of the authorities noted in this Article. These plans
would also identify employees who perform these services, as well as
employees who would be subject to furlough in the event of a gap in
funding.296 Fourth and finally, the Governor would require these heads to
adhere to these plans in the event that impasse precludes adoption of a
budget.
Proper adherence to separation of powers would require pursuit of one
of these last two options, or an option of a similar nature.
295 Ferguson v. Oates, 314 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1958).
296 Whether such employees would have a contractual right to payment for time
elapsed during a furlough upon resumption of funding is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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